Administrative Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform by Estelle James et al.
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Administrative Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security
Reform
Volume Author/Editor: John B. Shoven, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-75485-5
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/shov00-1
Publication Date: January 2000
Chapter Title: Mutual Funds and Institutional Investments -- What Is the Most
Efficient Way to Set Up Individual Accounts in a Social Security System?
Chapter Author: Estelle James, Gary Ferrier, James H. Smalhout, Dimitri
Vittas
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7469
Chapter pages in book: (p. 77 - 136)Institutional Investments 
What Is the Most Efficient Way 
to Set Up Individual Accounts 
in a Social Security System? 
Estelle James, Gary Ferrier, James Smalhout, and 
Dimitri Vittas 
Prefunding is  now seen as a desirable characteristic of  old-age security 
systems because it helps increase national saving, makes the financial sus- 
tainability of the system less sensitive to demographic shocks, and reduces 
the need to increase taxes as populations age. With prefunding comes the 
need to determine how the funds will be managed. Those who fear polit- 
ical manipulation  of  publicly  managed  funds  see  defined-contribution 
(DC) individual  accounts  (IAs) as  a way  to decentralize control  and 
thereby achieve a better allocation of the funds. But IAs have been criti- 
cized on other grounds, most important among them being high adminis- 
trative costs. Costs are especially high relative to assets at the start of a 
new system because of start-up expenses and fixed costs associated with 
each account. To illustrate why administrative costs are important: an an- 
nual cost of  1 percent of assets (slightly more than the up-front fee now 
charged in Chile) can reduce a worker’s retirement benefits by 20 percent. 
Moreover, costs are more predictable than returns and more amenable to 
policy choice. 
This paper investigates the cost effectiveness of three options for con- 
structing funded social security pillars: (1) IAs invested in the retail mar- 
ket with relatively open choice; (2)  IAs invested in the institutional market 
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with constrained choice for workers among investment companies; and 
(3) a centralized fund invested in the institutional market without individ- 
ual accounts or differentiated investments across individuals. Our ques- 
tions are the following: What is the most cost-effective way to organize a 
mandatory IA system, how does the cost of an efficient IA system com- 
pare with that of a single centralized fund, and are the cost differentials 
great enough to outweigh the other important considerations?' 
To answer these questions, we  use data from pension funds in  Chile 
(which was the first country to establish a decentralized IA system) and 
from mutual funds in the United States (because the best data are available 
here, the U.S. mutual fund industry is an example of a relatively well-run 
retail financial industry [which deals with numerous small investors], and 
the United States is currently considering how to reform its social security 
system). Observing that an institutional investment market (which deals 
with large investors) coexists with mutual funds in the United States, and 
at much lower cost, we  also use these data to identify and quantify the 
sources  of  economies  from  operating  in  the wholesale money  market. 
Costs in both the retail and the institutional markets would be higher in 
developing countries, but their relative positions should be similar to those 
described here. (For a discussion of applicability to developing countries, 
see James, Smalhout, and Vittas 1999.) We distinguish among asset-man- 
agement, marketing, and record-keeping costs, showing how each varies 
with type and size of system. 
Empirical evidence presented in this paper and elsewhere suggests the 
existence of large economies of scale and scope in asset management. All 
three  options exploit these economies, but in  different ways. The retail 
market (option 1) allows individual investors to benefit from scale econo- 
mies in asset management, but at the cost of high marketing expenses 
(almost  half  of total costs), which are needed to attract and aggregate 
small sums of money into large pools. At the start-up of a new IA system, 
the fixed cost per account for record keeping and communications (R&C) 
is also high, relative to assets. In contrast, a centralized fund (option 3) 
can be much cheaper because it achieves scale economies without high 
marketing or R&C costs but gives workers no choice and hence is subject 
to political manipulation and misallocation of capital. 
The system of constrained choice described in this paper (option 2) is 
1. We  concentrate on the asset-accumulation  phase since annuities pose a host of other 
issues. We  do not include the cost of pay-as-you-go schemes in this analysis since (unlike 
transfer systems) funded schemes represent either additional saving or diversions from other 
savings that would have incurred costs. Well-managed funded schemes cost more than well- 
managed pay-as-you-go schemes because they provide an additional service-the  manage- 
ment of savings. Savings provide productive value to the economy that one does not get from 
pay-as-you-go schemes, and some of this value is passed on to workers in the form of higher 
retirement benefits than they  could get  from  the  same contribution to a pay-as-you-go 
scheme. This paper is about how to manage those savings, not about whether to save. Mutual Funds and Institutional Investments  79 
much cheaper than the retail market and only slightly more expensive than 
a single centralized fund. It obtains economies in asset management and 
record keeping while keeping marketing costs low  and allowing signifi- 
cant worker choice, which helps insulate it from political interference. It 
accomplishes this by  aggregating small compulsory contributions into a 
large pool, which is then allocated across a limited number of funds ac- 
cording to worker choice but with centrally negotiated rates (via compe- 
titive bidding with limited entry or open entry with price ceilings) that 
discourage high marketing expenses. In countries with well-developed fi- 
nancial markets, passive investment is likely to be emphasized if the object 
is low  cost. If one values the cost saving as greater than the decreased 
marketing information and constraints on choice, this system will be more 
efficient than the retail approach, and, if  one values improved political 
insulation and adaptability to individual preferences, it is more efficient 
than the centralized approach. 
Section 3.1 sets up a hypothetical model that decomposes costs into 
asset-management, R&C,  and  marketing components. Section 3.2 pro- 
vides an international perspective by  examining costs in the mandatory 
AFP (administradoras  de fondos de pensiones) system in Chile, which uses 
the most common method, the retail market. Section 3.3 draws on data 
from voluntary saving in mutual funds in the United States. Both in Chile 
and in the United States, individuals have diversified accounts that they 
can move from one company to another in a competitive retail investment 
market. Although the American mutual fund industry is vastly more de- 
veloped  than  the Chilean AFP industry, we  find strong similarities, in 
terms of annualized costs as a percentage of assets and the composition of 
these costs. Average annual administrative costs range between 1 and 1.5 
percent of assets for most investors, and marketing is the largest cost com- 
ponent in both cases. In Chile, annual costs are less than  1 percent for 
those who start contributing early in their careers. In the United States, a 
low-cost niche of less than 1 percent has developed for passively managed 
funds indexed to various benchmarks. In both cases, costs were  higher 
fifteen years ago and have declined slightly as a result of asset growth and 
competition. These two cases give us insights into how an IA system might 
develop in the retail market. 
Section 3.4 explores costs in the institutional market, drawing on U.S. 
data once again. Administrative costs for pension funds and other large 
investors are estimated to be four to eight basis points (0.04-0.08  percent 
of assets) for passively managed portfolios and thirty-five to sixty-five ba- 
sis points  (0.35-0.65  percent  of  assets) for actively managed  domestic 
portfolios-much  less than the retail market. These large cost savings are 
due to economies of scale in the investment function, smaller costs in the 
marketing function, the virtual absence of record-keeping costs, and the 
greater bargaining power of large investors in an industry where average 80  Estelle James, Gary Ferrier, James Smalhout, and Dimitri Vittas 
costs greatly exceed marginal cost. These would also be the costs in a well- 
run centralized funded pillar with no IAs and no choice. 
Section 3.5 considers whether and how an IA system with constrained 
choice could be set up to benefit from these same economies. We  outline 
the elements of such a system~--which include worker  choice among a 
limited number of money managers chosen through a competitive bidding 
process (or through fee ceilings that discourage marketing expenditures). 
We estimate that such a system could operate with approximately the same 
investment costs as the centralized  fund. However, additional R&C costs 
will necessarily  be incurred if workers have individual accounts with dif- 
fering asset managers. Using data from the transfer-agent function of mu- 
tual funds and the experience ofthe  federal employees’ Thrift Savings Plan 
(TSP), we  find a relatively fixed  R&C dollar cost per account that falls 
rapidly as a percentage of assets as average account size grows. 
Thus, the steady-state cost in a constrained IA system in countries with 
well-developed financial markets is likely to be 0.14-0.18  percent of assets 
annually for a passively managed investment strategy (or 0.49-0.79  per- 
cent if active management  is chosen), including all money-management 
and record-keeping fees. For the system size that has been under consider- 
ation in the United States (average annual contributions of approximately 
$500), this amounts to $31-$39,  or $106- $172, per account, respectively. 
This is only ten basis points, or $21, per account per year higher than the 
cost or a centralized  scheme. It is much less than the expected  return to 
saving or the cost of voluntary or mandatory individual accounts in retail 
markets. Constrained choice offers large administrative cost savings com- 
bined with political insulation and is likely to imply a Pareto improvement 
so long as choice is not constrained “too much.” 
3.  I  How Administrative Costs Vary across Time and Systems 
We  start by setting forth a small model of the components of adminis- 
trative costs that can be used to understand  changes in costs across time 
and systems: 
TOTADMINCOST; =  STARTUPCOST +  FCOST +  R&C +  INV 
+ MARKETING, 
Where TOTADM INCOST; = total administrative cost for pension fund 
or system i in year r, STARTUPCOST = capital costs incurred in the early 
years of a new  system  or fund, FCOST = fixed cost needed  to operate 
in  year  f,  R&C  =  record-keeping  and  communication  (R&C) costs, 
INV = investment costs, and MARKETING = marketing cost. 
Each  of  these cost components is determined  quite difrerently.  R&C 
costs tend to be technologically determined and standardized, depending Mutual Funds and Institutional Investments  81 
on quality of service and number  of accounts. Passive investment costs 
are also technologically determined, depending on volume and allocation 
of assets. Active investment costs are market determined, stemming from 
the premium that a manager who is deemed to be superior can command 
in a market for differentiated investment skills. Marketing expenses usu- 
ally go together with active management since they are used to sell the 
skills of  a  particular  asset-management  company and they  depend on 
profit-maximizing calculations about the costs versus the net returns of 
incremental marketing activities. Suppose that, in choosing an investment 
manager, all consumers have the same fallback option that is low in cost 
and returns (say, a savings bank account or money market fund). They 
will not choose an active manager unless they expect him to yield a higher 
net return, after subtracting all expenses, including his wages and market- 
ing costs. Then the manager will  be able to charge a larger dollar skill 
premium and to spend a larger amount on marketing while still staying 
above this threshold return, as total assets in the system grow. This sce- 
nario would lead active investment and marketing costs to rise with assets 
even though this relation is not technologically determined. 
In comparing costs across funds or systems, it is necessary to take into 
account the total volume of assets and the number of accounts that deter- 
mine costs and to ascertain how these are likely to change in the future.2 
Table 3.1 illustrates the total administrative cost and its breakdown be- 
tween R&C and INV in three hypothetical systems as they evolve through 
time. Two cost measures are used-dollars  per account and basis points 
per unit of assets (one basis point = 0.01 percent). The first measure is 
useful because it tells us how much it costs to operate an account for an 
average worker, while the second measure tells us how much gross returns 
are being whittled away by administrative costs. While economies of scale 
are probable (see James and Palacios 1995; Mitchell 1998; and sec. 3.3 be- 
low), in this section, for the purposes of exposition, we assume that R&C 
cost per account and INV cost per unit of assets are constant. Scale econ- 
omies would slow down the growth and/or accelerate the decline in  all 
these cost measures. We  also abstract from annual fixed costs and high 
2. Additionally, different countries face differing relative factor prices and productivities. 
If the relevant  technologies tend to be capital intensive, then capital rich countries with 
relatively cheap capital will have lower costs per account and asset unit, while the opposite 
is true if the feasible technology set uses labor intensively, especially unskilled labor. Funds 
that operate in countries with a facilitating  legal and physical infrastructure, such as enforce- 
able contract rights and telephone lines that work, will be able to use their own labor and 
capital more productively. In international comparisons, costs are sometimes expressed as a 
percentage of the average wage, to normalize for differences in labor price and productivity 
across countries. Because of their relatively cheap costs of capital combined with the preva- 
lence of capital intensive technologies as well as the availability of legal and capital infra- 
structure, we would expect industrial countries to have lower administrative costs than others 
(ceteris paribus) as a percentage of average wage and also in terms of dollars per account 
and basis points per unit of assets. Table 3.1  Hypothetical Administrative Costs over Time as a Percentage of Assets and Dollars per Account 
A. The Institutional Approach with Passive Management” 
Year-End  Average-Size  Investment 
Accumulation  Account in  R&C  R&C + Investment  Expenses per  R&C + Investment 
of Individual  System  as YO  of  as YO  of  Account  per Account  R&C/Total Expenses 
































































































0.47 B. The Institutional Approach with Active Managementd 
Year-End  Average-Size  Investment 
Accumulation  Account in  R&C  R&C + Investment  Expenses per  R&C + Investment 
of Individual  System  as % of  as % of  Account  per Account  R&C/Total Expenses 
($)  ($)  per Account  Year  ($thousands)b  ($thousandsy  Assets  Assets 
1  0.5 
2  1 .o 
3  1.6 
4  2.1 
5  2.7 
10  6.1 
15  10.4 
20  15.7 
25  22.3 
30  30.5 
35  40.7 
40  53.5 
(continued) 
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0.14 Table 3.1  (continued) 
C. The Retail Approach' 
Costs as YO  of Assets  Costs in $ per Account 
Accumulation  Account in  R&C +  R&C + 
of Individual  System  R&C +  Investment +  Investment + 
Year-End  Average-Size 





































1  .so  2.10 
0.74  1.34 
0.50  1.10 
0.37  0.97 
0.29  0.89 
0.14  0.74 
0.09  0.69 
0.07  0.67 
0.06  0.66 
0.05  0.65 
0.04  0.64 


















































"Assumptions: $520 is contributed each year. R&C costs are $20 per account, so net contribution (NCON) = $500. Gross rate of return  = 5.1%, and 
investment costs are 0.1 percent of assets, so net return (NR) after subtracting investment costs = 5.0 percent. 
bIndividual's account accumulates at the following rate: A,  = A,-,  (1 + NR) + NCON, where NR = net return, and NCON = net contribution. 
'Account  size increases at above rate for individuals who stay in system. Withdrawals by  high-account individuals who retire and their replacement by 
incoming workers with small new accounts decrease average account size in system. Workers are evenly distributed across forty age groups. Steady state is 
reached in year 40. 
dAssumptions:  $520 is contributed each year. R&C costs are $20 per account, so net contribution = $500. Gross rate of return = 5.1 percent, and investment 
costs are 0.6 percent of assets, so net return after subtracting investment costs = 4.5 percent. 
'Assumptions: $2,020 is contributed each year. R&C costs are $30 per account, so net contribution = $1,990. Gross rate of return = 5.1 percent, investment 
costs are 0.6 percent of assets, and marketing costs are 0.5 percent, so net return after subtracting investment and marketing costs = 4 percent. Mutual Funds and Institutional Investments  85 
start-up costs at the beginning. While at this point these cost functions are 
hypothetical, we will see later that they are not implausible. 
Panel A of table 3.1 illustrates a stylized cost profile for an IA system 
that uses the institutional approach, with passive investing that costs 0.0 1 
percent of assets annually plus R&C costs of $20.00 per account. Panel 
B illustrates an institutional  approach with active investing-INV  cost 
rises to 0.6 percent. Panel C illustrates the retail approach, with marketing 
and investment expenses totaling 1.1 percent of assets plus R&C costs of 
$30.00 per account3  We see in table 3.1 the following: (1) Average (dollar) 
cost per account starts relatively low  and rises through time as average 
account size grows, owing to increased investment costs. (2) In contrast, 
average cost as a percentage of assets starts high and falls as average ac- 
count size grows, owing to constant R&C costs per account. (3) R&C 
costs dominate at the beginning, but their effect on net returns becomes 
much  smaller in  the  long  run,  when  investment and  marketing  costs 
dominate (particularly if  a high contribution rate and expensive invest- 
ment strategy are chosen [panels B and C]). (4) If an institutional approach 
with low investment costs is chosen, costs per account remain small, and 
costs as a percentage of assets become very small in the long run (panel 
A). (5)  An expensive investment and marketing strategy increases dollar 
costs per account by  a larger amount as time passes, although the nega- 
tive effect on net returns is constant through time (panel C). And (6) a 
larger contribution amount leads to a more rapid increase in dollar cost 
per  account, but  it decreases cost per  unit  of  assets at the  same time 
(panel C). 
While we  have been  defining costs to the fund and the system, costs 
(fees) to consumers may vary from this. In the short run, at the start-up 
of a new system, funds may run temporary losses in the expectation that 
they will  increase their market  share and recoup their capital expenses 
later on. In the medium term, they may earn profits that offset the earlier 
losses. We would expect that, in the long run, competition will eliminate 
pure profits so that fees to investors will just cover costs to the fund. But 
the existence of marketing competition, as well as potential skill and wage 
3. For panel A, the annual contribution is assumed to be $520, the neighborhood of many 
1A  systems in Latin America that feature decision making by  the individual worker. The 
United States has been considering an IA contribution rate of about $500 per year. R&C 
cost is $20 per account, which might be the fee for a modest-quality system, and INV cost 
(including brokerage and custodian  fees) is 0.1 percent per unit of assets, which is on the 
high side for a passive investment strategy. In panel B, INV cost rises to 0.6 percent, which 
might be charged by  active asset managers in an institutional IA system. Panel C illustrates 
the retail approach. The annual contribution is $2,020 per year, the neighborhood of manda- 
tory IA systems in several OECD countries. R&C cost is $30, INV cost is 0.6 percent, and 
MARKETING costs of 0.5 percent of assets are introduced.  In all cases, a gross rate of 
return (before fees) of 5.1 percent is assumed. In order to abstract from the effect of a chang- 
ing age distribution, we  assume that participants  are evenly distributed  across forty age 
groups and take their money out of the system when they retire. 86  Estelle James, Gary Ferrier, James Smalhout, and Dimitri Vittas 
differentials across asset managers, makes it difficult to predict the cost 
and fee level at which this zero-profit equilibrium will  occur. Moreover, 
price discrimination, used to recover fixed costs when heterogeneous con- 
sumers have different price elasticities, means that marginal cost and aver- 
age cost may have different relations to price for different groups of inves- 
tors. In this paper, we focus on fees that are paid by the average investor, 
we  presume that, in the long run, these fees will  bear a close relation to 
real costs, and costs depend on how the system is organized. 
A well-run centralized fund without IAs has the cost advantage of lower 
R&C expenses since it features only one investment account (although 
additional records must be kept of the benefit entitlements of each worker) 
and potential use of bargaining power to secure low investment and mar- 
keting costs (as in panels A and B minus R&C costs). But it has the disad- 
vantage of creating a principal-agent problem and lack of political insula- 
tion if it is managed by the government: for these reasons, it may not end 
up minimizing costs or maximizing returns or being run in the workers’ 
best interests. In contrast, the retail market for IAs incurs R&C costs for 
many small accounts, expensive investment strategies may be chosen, and 
marketing costs are often high (as in panel C). We argue that, by operating 
in the institutional market, an IA system may achieve most of the cost 
advantages of centralized funds, but with greater political insulation and 
responsiveness to workers’ preferences. The institutional approach to IA 
systems aggregates many small accounts into large blocs of money and 
negotiates fees on a centralized basis-via  a competitive bidding process 
or open entry with price ceilings. This can keep costs and fees low  by 
(1) constraining worker choice to low-INV-cost portfolios and strategies; 
(2) minimizing incentives for MARKETING cost by reducing allowable 
fees; (3) dampening R&C expenditures; (4) cutting STARTUPCOST and 
FCOST by avoiding excess capacity; and (5) increasing bargaining power, 
hence decreasing oligopoly profits. When these strategies are utilized, the 
cost of an IA system is only minimally higher than that of a well-run cen- 
tralized fund without IAs. 
3.2  How High Are Administrative Fees in Chile, 
and How Are They Spent? 
In this section, we  examine the administrative costs and fees of Chilean 
AFPs, which have been operating since 1981. These fees have been subject 
to great criticism by  opponents of IA systems. In Chile, the worker pays 
a fee to the AFP, which is an administrator that sets up the fund and runs 
it. Practically all expenses are paid by the AFP, not the worker or the fund 
dire~tly.~  So fees do not necessarily represent real costs of operating the 
4.  An exception is the fees paid by AFPs to foreign mutual funds, which invest about 10 
percent of the AFP assets abroad. These mutual fund fees are subtracted from the workers’ 
accounts. Mutual Funds and Institutional Investments  87 
fund, especially in the short run, nor do they represent a long-term com- 
mitment. AFPs incurred losses in the early years of the new system when 
start-up costs exceeded revenues, but  the industry  as a  whole is quite 
profitable and more concentrated at this stage (table 3.2). We might expect 
price competition to eliminate these profits, but price insensitivity among 
investors and entry barriers to new firms may prevent this from happening 
quickly. Deregulation and oligopoly may alter costs and their relation to 
fees in the future in ways that are difficult to predict. For example, in an 
industry characterized by differentiated competition, marketing costs play 
a large role, and we do not know whether they will increase or decrease 
as the industry grows more concentrated.s As regulations are liberalized, 
portfolio diversification increases, and managerial skill is deemed increas- 
ingly important, wages may rise for managers who are perceived as more 
skillful, costs to the AFPs that employ them may increase, expenditures 
to advertise their superior skills may become more costly, and fees to their 
members may rise. Despite this uncertainty about the future, the current 
fee structure poses costs to investors that reduce their net returns, so, in 
this section, we take them as given and examine their implications. 
Chile adopted an unusual method of charging fees: the fee is imposed 
when the contribution first enters the system, and no management fees are 
charged on that contribution thereafter. The fee started at over 20 percent 
of contributions but has fallen to an average level of 15.6 percent. Anec- 
dotal evidence indicates that many workers receive rebates on sales com- 
missions, so, for them, the effective fee may be only 13 percent of contribu- 
tions or less. (In other Latin American countries, such as Argentina and 
Mexico, where the contribution rate is smaller, fees are still over 20 percent 
of contributions, while, in Bolivia, which has experimented with a new 
administrative  system, they are lower [see James, Smalhout, and Vittas 
19991.) Charging fees that are based on new contributions is an extremely 
front-loaded method as compared with the customary practice in mutual 
funds of charging an annual fee that is based on assets, sometimes supple- 
mented with a sales charge on purchases. 
This fee structure means that, if a worker enters the system for a year 
but then drops out (e.g., to become self-employed or to withdraw from the 
labor market), he or she ceases to pay fees while keeping his or her assets 
in  the system. For new  systems (e.g., Poland, Uruguay), the number of 
contributors and affiliates is very close, but, for more mature IA systems 
(e.g., Chile, Singapore), the number of affiliates is roughly double the num- 
ber  of active contributors.  (Inactive affiliates require the AFP to incur 
expenditures for annual statements and asset management, while active 
5. The recent spate of mergers in Chile has decreased the number of AFPs from twenty- 
one in the early  1990s to eight currently. In  Argentina,  the number  has decreased  from 
twenty-five to sixteen and will probably decrease even more. This suggests that the market 
is gradually responding to economies of scale-as  in the US. mutual fund industry. Table 3.2  Assets, Fees, and Expenditures in Chile through Time 
No. of  Total Assets/  Total Assets/  Marketing Costs 
Affiliates  Contributors/  Assets  Contributors  Afliliates  as YO  of Total 























































































































46 Fee per  Expenses per  Fee per  Expenses  Fee per Unit  Expenses per 
Unit of Assets  Contributor  Contributor  Affiliate  per Affiliate  of Assets 
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contributors  incur  additional  expenses for  periodic  contributions  and 
fund switches.) 
According to table 3.2, after the period of high start-up costs, cost and 
fee per account drop precipitously but then rise gradually as average ac- 
count size grows, consistent with the hypothetical model presented in sec- 
tion 3.1. In 1998, average cost per contributor was $112 and per affiliate 
$7  1, and fees were slightly higher. As we shall see, these numbers are lower 
than in mutual funds in the United States, corresponding to the much high- 
er average account size in the latter. Fees and costs as a percentage of as- 
sets have also been falling through time, but much more gradually, as pre- 
dicted in the hypothetical retail model. They are now 1.36 percent (fees) 
and 1.13 percent (costs). We  observe, too, that marketing costs are large. 
Table 3.3 presents the results of a panel-data (fixed-effects) analysis that 
sums up this relation between assets, affiliates, costs, and fees over time 
and across AFPs. We see there that (1) start-up fees and, even more, start- 
up costs in the first three years of operations were high; (2) as number of 
affiliates grows, costs and fees relative to assets grow (because of R&C 
costs); and (3) as average account size increases, (investment) cost per ac- 
count also increases but (because of scale economies) cost per dollar of 
assets (which ultimately determines the net return) decreases. This is con- 
sistent with the hypothetical retail market depicted in table 3.1 above. We 
infer from this that (1) it is misleading to extrapolate costs and fees from 
the first years of a new system, which unfortunately has often been done; 
(2) investment costs play an increasingly dominant role but scale econo- 
mies stemming from large asset bases limit this increase; and (3) in com- 
paring the administrative efficiency of systems across countries, it is essen- 
tial to take into account whether they are in their start-up period and what 
their size is in terms of assets and affiliates since two systems that  are 
equally efficient in the long run under similar conditions will differ at any 
point in time depending on their maturity and scale. Chile, and even more 
so other Latin American countries, will probably benefit further from mat- 
uration and scale economies in the future. 
In any event, a 15.6 percent fee on contributions reduces the final capi- 
tal accumulation and pension by  15.6 percent. Is this fee high or low? To 
answer this question, it is useful to compare the fee with other institutional 
arrangements  for  handling  retirement  savings, both in Chile and else- 
where. This paper concentrates on comparing it with fees in the retail and 
institutional  market in the United  States. For this purpose, we  convert 
these front-loaded fees into their annual asset-based equivalents (which 
will yield the same final year accumulation). This tells us how much gross 
investment returns will  be reduced to obtain net returns  and enables a 
direct comparison with mutual funds and large institutional investors in 
the United States and elsewhere. This conversion depends on how long 
the worker will keep his or her money in the system, which in turn depends 
on his or her age and career pattern. Table 3.3  Fixed-Effects Panel Regression Analysis: Determinants of Costs and Fees, Chile, Disaggregated by  AFP and Year, 1982-98 
Dependent Variables 
Total  Total Cost/ 
Independent Variables  Administrative Cost  Assets 
Assetdaffiliates  ,002  -  .0003 
(10.42)*  (-3.83)* 
No. of affiliates  48.89  2.34 
Dummy, start-up  11.28  14.02 
Dummy, start-up  6.71  3.48 
Constant  -8.41  3.18 
R2: 
(21.96)*  (2.63)** 
year = 1982  (6.12)*  (19.00)* 
years = 1983-84  (4.74)*  (6.13)* 





























-  ,0002 
(- 5.82)* 
-  .43 
(- 1.03) 
5.20 















Within  .81  .68  .I7  32  .70  .50 
Between  .56  .2 1  .04  .65  .74  .88 
Overall  .78  .47  .21  .80  .69  .83 
N  234  234  234  234  234  234 
Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses. Units of measurement: costs, fees, and assets are 1998 U.S. dollars in millions; number of contributors and 
affiliates are in millions; cost/assets and feedassets are in percentages; cost/affiliates, feeslaffiliates, and assetslaffiliates  are in 1998 US. dollars. 
*Significant at the 0.1 percent level. 
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Table 3.4  Annual Asset-Based Fee Equivalent to 15.6 Percent Fee on New 
Contributions (as a percentage of assets) 
Contributions Made  Contributions Made 
Age 65, Starting at 
Contribution Made  for 20 Years Only,  Every Year until 
for 1 Year Only at  Starting at 
Given Age  Given Age  Given Age 



















Note: This table shows the annual fee based on assets that will yield the same capital accumu- 
lation at age sixty-five as would a 15.6 percent front-loaded fee on incoming contributions. 
In col. 1 a single year of contributions is assumed at the starting age. The annual fee for age 
sixty-four is 33.37 percent because contributions and fees are assumed to be paid monthly, 
including the last month. In col. 2 the worker continues contributing a fixed percentage of 
wage for twenty years. In col. 3 the worker continues investing a fixed percentage of wage 
from starting age until age sixty-five.  A rate of return of 5 percent is assumed. For cols. 2 and 3, 
annual wage growth of 2 percent is assumed. (Similar results were obtained for 3 percent rate 
of return and 1 percent rate of wage growth.) In US. dollars, the average contributor paid $134 
in 1998  in Chile. The fee would increase 2 percent per year under these assumptions. 
We have simulated the average annual fee on assets that is equivalent to 
the front-loaded 15.6 percent fee on contributions for workers of different 
ages at the point when the contribution was made (table 3.4). This simula- 
tion assumes that the same fee schedule remains in effect over the worker’s 
lifetime, although of course there is no guarantee that this will be the case. 
For a twenty-five-year-old worker (who contributes for one year only but 
whose money stays in the system for another forty years), the 15.6 percent 
one-time fee is equivalent to 0.45 percent of assets annually; for a forty- 
five-year-old worker, it is 0.91 percent; and, for a worker who contributes 
monthly in his final year, it is 32.4 percent (col. 1). For a worker who con- 
tributes every year for forty years (e.g., from age twenty-five to age sixty- 
five), paying a fee on each new contribution, the annual equivalent of all 
these front-loaded fees is 0.76 percent of assets (col. 3).6 
Many workers will contribute for twenty years only because this is the 
period that makes them eligible for the minimum pension guarantee. For 
these workers, the equivalent annual fee depends on whether the contribu- 
tions were made early or late in their careers, which determines how many 
years their money will be under management. If a worker contributes only 
6. These calculations assume a 5 percent gross rate of return and a 2 percent rate of wage 
growth. Calculations with 3 percent and 4 percent rates of return and/or a 1 percent rate of 
wage growth yield very similar results. These simulations show that workers with different 
employment histories will end up paying different annual equivalent fees as a subtraction 
from their gross returns even if they impose the same real cost on the fund-which  may not 
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for his first twenty years of employment, the equivalent average annual fee 
for all his contributions is 0.57 percent, while, if  contributions are made 
only in the last twenty years, the equivalent average annual fee is  1.65 
percent (col. 2). (The latter is roughly consistent with the 1.4 percent of as- 
sets that is paid by  the average worker today, eighteen years after the sys- 
tem got started.) Suppose that half of all workers contribute for forty years, 
one-quarter each for their first and last twenty years. The systemwide an- 
nual equivalent expense ratio would be 0.94 percent, almost 1 percent of 
assets per year. 
These estimated lifetime fees are similar to but somewhat lower than 
average mutual fund fees in the United States (see sec. 3.3 below). Ameri- 
can mutual funds, of course, provide greater diversification and service 
than Chilean AFPs, which would make their costs higher. But they also 
benefit from greater economies of scale and better infrastructure, which 
would make their costs lower. AFP costs are much lower than the costs of 
U.S. mutual funds that operate in emerging markets. They are much lower 
than mutual fund fees for voluntary saving in Chile, which, during the 
early 1990s, averaged around 6 percent per year for equity funds and 2 
percent for bond funds, plus entrance and exit charges (Maturana and 
Walker 1999). AFP fees are also lower than those of mutual funds in most 
other countries, where the combination  of  front loads and annual fees 
exceeds levels in the United States. Chilean AFPs are therefore relatively 
inexpensive if the standard of comparison is fees in other financial institu- 
tions that invest individuals’ savings in a diversified portfolio. However, 
they are more expensive than savings accounts in commercial banks, ei- 
ther in Chile or elsewhere (Valdes 1999). 
The breakdown  of  costs among AFPs shows that over 45  percent  of 
total expenditures was used for marketing costs, especially sales commis- 
sions. This proportion is similar to marketing expenses in the retail finan- 
cial markets in the United States and other countries. In both cases, the 
number would  probably exceed 50 percent  if  we  included staff salaries 
involved in marketing. These similarities suggest that a study of US. mu- 
tual fund data might yield insights into the determinants of costs in IA 
systems and how these costs might be reduced. 
Finally, AFP fees are much higher than are the fees paid by institutional 
investors (see sec. 3.4 below), and they have a substantial effect on ultimate 
pension amounts. This leads one to wonder whether it is possible to orga- 
nize a mandatory IA system so that it captures the lower costs of the in- 
stitutional market and, if  so, what the trade-offs are. 
3.3  Costs in the Retail Market of American Mutual Funds 
The mutual fund in  the United States has been a hugely successful fi- 
nancial institution. Assets have grown from less than $1 billion in  1949 to 
almost $140 billion in 1980 to over $4 trillion by  the end of 1997 and now 94  Estelle James, Gary Ferrier, James Smalhout, and Dimitri Vittas 
exceed the combined total of  savings bank  deposits and life insurance 
assets (Pozen 1998). The variety of fund objectives and ancillary services 
has also escalated, with equity funds expanding much more quickly than 
bond or money market funds over the last twenty years. Savers apparently 
feel that investing through mutual funds gives them advantages in terms 
of convenience, liquidity, and diversification that justify the fees. 
Our object was to analyze the determinants of mutual fund fees and 
how they are spent in order to shed light on how costs might evolve or 
might be shaped in a reformed social security system with individual ac- 
counts. We used simple cross-tabulations, regression analysis, and frontier 
analysis based on a large data set of mutual funds (4,254 funds in 1997 
and 1,300-2,000 each year for 1992-96)  that we obtained from Morning- 
star. We  also culled information from annual reports, fund prospectuses, 
and financial statements filed by the funds’ investment advisers as well as 
surveys conducted  by  the association of  mutual  funds and discussions 
with fund officials and their transfer agents.’ 
In the United States, as in Chile, mutual funds are organized by spon- 
sors, but they are not owned by  these sponsors. Instead, the assets are 
owned by the shareholders who invest in them. A board of directors (most 
of whom are affiliated with the sponsor) chooses the investment adviser, 
who, in almost all cases, is the original sponsor of the fund. Often, the 
same sponsor starts multiple funds in a fund complex such as Fidelity or 
Vanguard. The adviser makes key  strategic decisions, hires analysts and 
portfolio managers (who handle day-to-day investment activities), adver- 
tises the fund, and provides other administrative services. Competition 
takes the form of investors exiting and entering funds rather than funds 
choosing and reevaluating investment advisers (Baumol et al. 1990). 
Marketing and service have been major instruments in the competition 
among funds for investors. In contrast, price competition seems to have 
played a relatively minor role, especially in the short run. Later, we  inter- 
pret this as a consequence of product  differentiation and a high noise- 
to-signal ratio in volatile markets, which makes it difficult to distinguish 
between random good luck that will not repeat and low costs that will 
repeat in the future. 
3.3.1 
The fund pays annual fees to the investment adviser and much smaller 
amounts to distributors (12bl fees), lawyers, auditors, transfer agents, and 
others (table 3.5). By regulation, the charges are passed on to shareholders 
Costs in the Mutual Fund Industry 
7. Money market funds, which constitute about one-quarter of the fund universe, were 
largely excluded from this study because they involve short-term deposits, high transactions 
levels, and related costs that would not be applicable to IAs in social security systems. Mu- 
tual funds with missing data for important variables were also excluded. We  included only 
“open-end funds” whose shares are bought and sold at net asset value-total  assets divided 
by total shares. Mutual Funds and Institutional Investments  95 




Average  Average  Active  Passive 
Expenses included in expense ratio: 
Investment adviser 
Distributor for 12bl feesa 
Transfer agent (R&C) 
Other (legal, audit, etc.) 
Reported expense ratio 
$s per accountb 
Other investor costs: 
Brokerage fees (trading costs) 
Annualized front-loaded sales 
charge paid by  shareholdef 
Total investor costs as YO  of assets 









































dThe 12bl fee is a fee that is paid annually by  the fund, primarily for distribution of new 
shares and related service. It is financed by a charge paid by all shareholders, whether or not 
they have purchased their shares through a broker. It is part of the fund’s expense ratio and 
is based on assets. The front-loaded sales charge is paid directly to the distributor by inves- 
tors who purchase through brokers, as a percentage of their new investment. It is not in- 
cluded in the fund’s expense ratio. The average front-loaded fee is 4.48 percent. It is charged 
by about one-third of all funds. In this table, this one-time fee has been annualized according 
to the procedure described in n. 8. These numbers are averaged over all funds, ignoring the 
big distinction in costs to shareholders between funds that impose sales charges and those 
that do not (see table 3.10 below). 
hFor average account size = $25,000. 
proportional to their assets and determine the fund’s reported  “expense 
ratio,” which it subtracts from its gross return to obtain the investors’ net 
return. Thus (unlike in Chile), shareholder fees paid to the fund equal the 
costs of the fund, although they may yield large profits to the investment 
adviser. In addition, for many funds, front-loaded and back-loaded com- 
missions are paid directly by individual investors to brokers on purchase 
or sale; these entry and exit fees are part of the price to relevant sharehold- 
ers, although they are not received or paid by  the fund and are not in- 
cluded in the expense ratio. Brokerage fees paid for securities transactions 
are also excluded from the expense ratio, although they are indirectly paid 
by  shareholders in the form of reduced gross returns. 
We  have constructed a “total investor-cost ratio,” which equals the re- 
ported expense ratio plus average brokerage (trading) costs and  annu- 
alized front-loaded sales commissions (table 3.5).8 In 1997, the total inves- 
8. Average brokerage costs were estimated on the basis of a subset of funds that reported 
these data for 1997. The unweighted and weighted averages were twenty-six and twelve basis 
points, respectively. 
Annualized front-loaded sales commissions were estimated as 0.2 times the front-loaded 96  Estelle James, Gary Ferrier, James Smalhout, and Dimitri Vittas 
tor cost was 1.85  percent of assets, compared to the reported expense ratio 
of  1.28 percent. Weighted by  assets, these numbers fall to 1.43 and 0.91 
percent  (or  $360  and  $228  per  average  account),  respectively.  Asset- 
weighted numbers are more relevant for our purposes because they indi- 
cate the expense incurred by the average dollar invested. The lower asset- 
weighted figures are consistent with economies of scale and/or a selection 
of clients into low-cost funds. The variation  in  costs is  also great. For 
example, the average dollar invested in passively managed funds incurs a 
cost ratio that is only one-fifth the expense of a dollar invested in actively 
managed funds. 
Table 3.6 converts these numbers into the cost categories set forth in 
section 3.1-R&C  costs, investment costs, marketing expenses, and fixed 
costs-both  in terms of dollars per account and as a percentage of assets. 
Comparing table 3.6 with the hypothetical numbers in table 3.1 above for 
an average account size of $25,000, we  see that the costs are somewhat 
larger than but very close in breakdown to panel C of table 3.1. Investment 
commission on new sales. An annualization factor of 0.2 was used to convert a one-time fee 
into its annual present-value equivalent, assuming that the average investment is kept in the 
fund for seven years and that the discount rate is 10 percent. A high discount rate is used 
because the alternative for these investors may be an additional mutual fund purchase, over 
a period in which the three-year asset-weighted net return was 20 percent. The annualization 
factor and the annualized fee are not very sensitive to the discount rate; a discount rate of 5 
percent would have made a difference of only three basis points. 
The seven-year average holding period is a guestimate since good data are not available 
on this variable. A sample of redemption rates for equity funds purchased in 1974 showed 
that 50 percent of original shares were sold within five years, 76 percent within fifteen years, 
which is roughly consistent with our seven-year assumption (Wyatt Co. 1990). However, the 
mutual fund industry and its clientele have changed substantially since 1974, so it is likely 
that redemption behavior has also changed. An average holding period of ten to twelve years 
would have reduced the annualized fee by five to ten basis points, while an average five-year 
holding period would have increased it by a similar amount. Holding periods and therefore 
annualization factors may vary among funds. For example, evidence suggests that loads dis- 
courage movements out of funds, so the holding periods of funds with loads may be higher 
than average (Ippolito  1992; Chordia  1996). However, we  did not have the disaggregated 
data that would allow us to take these differences into account. 
Back-loaded sales charges are omitted from this calculation because they fall as a function 
of the time the shares are held. Investors self-select into funds with back loads if they expect 
to hold their shares for long periods. The average deferred load paid for assets held more 
than five years is negligible, and we  do not have a more detailed distribution of holding 
periods. This omission slightly understates total costs. 
The total fund-expense profile calculated here is very similar to the total shareholder-cost 
ratio calculated by  Rea and Reid (1998), although they use slightly different data sets and 
definitions. The most important differences are that they deal only with equity funds (which 
are more expensive than bond funds) and that they do not include brokerage fees in their 
measure, probably because they are interested in changes through time and data on broker- 
age fees were not reported before 1996. These two effect may cancel themselves out in terms 
of a comparison with our numbers. Their simple average-cost ratio is 1.99 percent and their 
asset-weighted average 1.44 percent, very similar to our numbers of 1.85 and 1.43 percent, 
respectively. According to their calculations, marketing fees are 40 percent of total costs, 
while, in our calculations (which include brokerage costs in the denominator), the simple 
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Table 3.6  Mutual Fund Expenses by Cost Components, 1997 
A. As a Percentage of Assets 
Weighted  Actively  Passively 
Average  Managed  Managed 
Investment  0.61  0.64  0.1 1 
R&C  0.12  0.12  0.05 
Marketing  0.61  0.65  0.03 
Fixed and miscellaneous  0.09  0.08  0.13 
Total  1.43  1.50  0.32 
B. In Dollars per Account 
Investment  153  160  28 
R&C  30  30  13 
Marketing  153  163  8 
Fixed and miscellaneous  23  20  33 
Total  360  315  80 




43  43  34 
8  8  16 
43  44  9 
Fixed and miscellaneous  6  5  41 
Total  100  100  100 
Source: Table 3.5 above. 
Note: For conversion into dollars, average account size = $25,000. Investment = investment 
adviser + brokerage fees. R&C = transfer agent. Marketing = 12bl fees + loads. Fixed & 
miscellaneous = other. Marketing costs are understated and investment costs overstated be- 
cause part of the investment adviser’s fee is spent on advertising and organizing sales efforts. 
Totals differ slightly from some of subcategories owing to rounding errors. 
costs far exceed R&C cost, and marketing cost is the largest component 
for many funds. 
More than half the reported  expense ratio is paid  to the investment 
adviser, who then allocates the money among the factors of production. 
While, in  our simple breakdown, we  have allocated this to “investment 
expenses,” actually some of it is spent on advertising, the development of 
new products and technologies, and other functions. This disaggregation 
is  difficult  to  obtain  since most  fund  sponsors are private  companies, 
which are not required to disclose their records. 
Other problems related to measuring and understanding mutual fund 
costs are the following (except for the last point, we  do not believe that 
these problems bias our major results): (1) Disclosure of brokerage costs 
(for securities transactions) was not required  until  1996, and brokerage 
costs are reported  for only a  subset of  our funds for  1996 and  1997. 
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its adviser (i.e., the “soft-dollar’’  issue), thereby reducing the reported cost 
that goes into the expense ratio and understating real expenditures on 
these items. (3) Some investment returns are reported net of cost, without 
data for the cost of producing them. (4) Income from securities lending 
operations is sometimes used to offset custodial and other expenses, which 
are therefore underestimated by reported fees. (5) Some funds do not re- 
port number of  shareholders, and the growing use of omnibus accounts 
that consolidate many shareholders further complicates the use of this ex- 
planatory variable. (6)  Investment advisers temporarily waive some fees, 
especially fees of new funds, as a business strategy to attract new custom- 
ers but may later reinstate them; these temporary fees may not reflect real 
costs. (7) The data set includes only funds that were still operating in 1997, 
and it therefore suffers from survivorship bias. Many expensive or poorly 
performing older funds have terminated, which may lead to an understate- 
ment of costs or an overstatement of expected returns. (8) Many share- 
holders pay a front-loaded one-time sales charge directly to brokers or 
other sales agents. These charges are not reported as fund expenses. To 
include them, we had to annualize them on the basis of estimated holding 
periods for which we  lack good data, so caution is  needed to interpret 
these estimates of  marketing expenses. (9) The invisible diseconomy of 
scale-the  effect  of  a  fund’s buying and  selling activities on security 
price-is  not measured here. This may lead to an overstatement of scale 
economies, especially in small-cap and thin markets where the fund owns 
a large part of total capitalization. (10) Most funds are members of a mu- 
tual fund complex (e.g., Fidelity and Vanguard). Certain activities, such as 
advertising, research, and new product development, are  jointly supplied to 
all members of the complex by the common investment adviser. The allo- 
cation of these expenses among the funds may be influenced by estimates 
of where the expenses can be absorbed with least loss of clients (see point 6 
above). Thus, the relative fees paid by members of a fund complex do not 
necessarily reflect the real cost of producing them. Perhaps most important 
for our purposes, business strategy concerning joint cost allocation may 
be different in a mandatory system given its different clientele. 
3.3.2  Specification of Regressions 
The main dependent variable in our regressions is the “expense ratio”- 
reported expenses (excluding brokerage fees and loads) as a percentage 
of assets. We did not use the “total investor-cost ratio” as our dependent 
variable because reliable data were not available for holding periods by 
fund or on brokerage costs for most funds in the data set. Front-loaded 
sales commissions, a large portion of  total marketing expenses, are not 
part of the expense ratio, but  they are treated as an independent  vari- 
able that may influence the expense ratio and are discussed as a market- 
ing cost. 
We sought to determine the extent to which cost variation is random or Mutual Funds and Institutional Investments  99 
Table 3.7  Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation of Variables in Sample, 1997 
Asset-Weighted  Simple  Simple 
Mean  Mean  Median  S.D. 
Expense ratio (as I%  of assets) 
Assets ($billions) 
No. of shareholders (thousands) 
Assets in family funds ($billions) 
3-year net return (%) 
3-year gross return (YO) 
3-year standard deviation 
Turnover (%) 
Fundage 







Initial investment ($10,000-$lOO,OOO) 
Index 
Low 12bl fee (0.25 percent or less) 


































































systematic, to identify the factors that lie behind the systematic variation, 
and to assess the implications for IA systems. Our independent variables 
fall into three main groups-a  core group capturing economies of scale 
and scope for the key outputs (investment of assets and R&C services per 
account) as well as the possible relation between costs, returns, and risk; 
an asset-allocation group acknowledging that different real costs are im- 
plied by different portfolios; and a business- and marketing-strategy group 
reflecting decisions made by the fund’s adviser, such as whether the fund 
should be actively or passively managed, whether it should seek large (in- 
stitutional) investors, etc. (table 3.7): 
Core Group 
Assets (in billions of dollars) 
Asset2 
Assets in entire fund complex 
Number of accounts (in thousands) or, alternatively, average assets per ac- 
Three-year gross return or, alternatively, three-year load-adjusted net re- 
Three-year standard deviation of returns 
count 
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Asset -  A llo  ca t ion Group 
Dummy variables for funds that specialize in bonds, small-cap stocks, spe- 
cial  sector  stocks,  international  (industrialized-country)  funds,  and 
emerging market funds, with large-cap stock funds as the omitted cat- 
egory 
Business- und Marketing-Strategy  Group 
Minimum investment required 
Stock turnover rate 
Fund age 
Dummy variables for funds that sell only to institutional (very large) cli- 
ents, index funds, bank-advised funds, funds with high (equal to 1) or 
low (greater than 0 but less than 1) 12bl fees, and funds with front loads 
and deferred loads 
We ran the OLS regressions separately for each year from 1992 to 1997. 
We  also conducted a frontier (envelope) analysis for 1992-97,  which in- 
cluded a time trend as an additional variable. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 report re- 
sults from the OLS regression for 1997 and the frontier analysis for 1992- 
97, which yield a consistent picture of the determinants of mutual fund 
costs. The OLS regressions explain 64 percent of the variance when all 
the variables listed above are included, with the business- and marketing- 
strategy group accounting for more than half the predictive power. Most 
of the variance in costs is therefore systematic rather than random. Costs 
faced by investors vary in large part because of business choices made by 
fund managers, and these same costs could be substantially influenced by 
policy choices in a mandatory IA system. 
3.3.3 
Expense ratios fall when  total assets in the fund, assets in the entire 
fund complex, and assets per shareholder increase. For funds with assets 
under $10 million, the simple average expense ratio is 1.54 percent, while, 
for funds with  assets over $1 billion, it is 0.96 percent. All funds need 
industry analysts, portfolio managers, computers, and access to electronic 
trading facilities. Large funds, however, can be managed with virtually the 
same staff and trading access as smaller funds. The scale economies come 
from  marketing  costs as well  as investment  management:  large  funds 
spread  their  advertising  expenses (and, less important,  their  legal, ac- 
counting, and audit expenses) over a larger asset base. Partly for these 
reasons, the largest and fastest-growing mutual funds also experienced the 
greatest drop in operating expenses over the last twenty years (Rea and 
Reid 1998).9 
Economies of Scale and Scope 
9. For more on sources of scale economies, see Baumol et al. (1990) and Sirri and Tu- 
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(5.53) Table 3.8  (continued) 
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12bl fee < 1, > 0 





























23.8  22.2  26.9  64.2 
127.6  127.6  127.6  127.6 
















Note: Brokerage fees and front and deferred loads are not included in expense ratios. The dependent variable is total expenses/total assets, in basis points 
(1 basis point = 0.01 percent). t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
‘Three-year net returns are gross returns adjusted for expense ratio and loads. 
*Significant at the 0.2 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. Table 3.9  Frontier Analysis: Determinants of Expense Ratios of Mutual Funds in the United 
States, 199297 





No. of shareholders (thousands) 
Assetskhareholders 
Assets in fund complex ($billions) 
3-year net return" 
3-year gross return 











12bl fee < 1,  > 0 













































1  .O* 
(- 11.59) 

















































(7.46) 104  Estelle James, Gary Ferrier, James Smalhout, and Dimitri Vittas 








2.3*  2.3*  2.3*  I .2* 
(11.17)  (10.66)  (10.96)  (6.41) 
Note; Brokerage fees and loads are not included in expense ratios. The dependent variable is totai 
expensedtotal assets, in basis points (1 basis point = 0.01 percent). t-statistics are given in parentheses 
”Three-year net returns are gross returns adjusted for expense ratio and loads. 
*Significant at the 0.2 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
On the one hand, scale economies may be somewhat underestimated in 
these regressions because fund complexes may subsidize their new smaller 
funds, charging them less than full costs while they are “infants,” and earn- 
ing a higher profit margin on their large, well-established funds, where 
clients may be less responsive to small differences in fees. On the other 
hand, scale economies may be overstated for certain types of assets, such 
as small-cap and emerging market stocks. Reverse causation may also be 
at work: low-cost funds may have attracted large amounts of assets rather 
than vice versa. We were not able to distinguish between these two effects 
in this paper. 
Perhaps most important,  these economies from asset aggregation do 
not continue indefinitely. The positive sign on the coefficient of Asset* in 
the regressions brings to a halt the fall in expense ratio when fund size 
reaches the  $20-$40  billion  range. Other studies have found that scale 
economies stemming from the size of the entire fund complex may stop at 
$20-$40  billion in the United States and at Fr 2.9 billion, a much lower 
level, in France (Collins and Mack 1997; Dermine and Roller 1992). Price 
impact, not measured here, also places brakes on scale economies, espe- 
cially in  illiquid markets. The fact that many  small funds coexist with 
larger ones is further evidence of the limits to scale economies and also 
of the gradualness of the market process in adjusting to these economies. 
Thus,  aggregation  brings  economies that  lead  to industry  concentra- 
tion, but the limit to these economies nevertheless leaves space for mul- 
tiple mutual funds (and pension funds), the exact number depending on 
the total  market  size of each country. A  mandatory IA system in the 
United States would generate over $60 billion of new contributions annu- 
ally, even with a small contribution rate of 2 percent. Such flows are large 
enough to offer options among many fund managers at a cost-effective 
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3.3.4 
Holding  aggregate assets constant,  the  expense  ratio  increases with 
number of shareholders, but this effect disappears once such strategy vari- 
ables as minimum investment are controlled. The expense ratio decreases 
as average account size rises. The basic reason, as seen above, is that funds 
incur a cost per account for R&C; the larger each account, the smaller 
this cost will be as a percentage of assets. 
R&C costs are $20-$25  for an average-size account, according to these 
regressions. According to corroborating evidence from periodic surveys 
of transfer agents (the organizations that provide these services for mutual 
funds), average R&C costs per account have been quite constant in this 
range during the 1990s. In 1995, the average cost was $21, and 80 percent 
of all funds reported R&C costs between $10 and $32 (see sec. 3.5 below). 
Fixed costs per account associated with R&C pose a potential problem 
for IA systems if the accounts are small; $20 is 4 percent of a $500 account 
but less than 0.1 percent of a $25,000 account, approximately the current 
level for mutual funds. These fixed costs help explain the high expense 
ratios of new AFPs and mutual funds in developing countries. This raises 
the question of whether an investment option with lower R&C costs (basic 
service, limited transferability) should be used initially or whether these 
fixed costs should be amortized over a long time period, to avoid imposing 
a heavy burden on early cohorts, in new IA systems. 
3.3.5  High Marketing Costs 
Aggressive marketing strategies have been developed by  mutual funds 
to maximize the  assets under  their management.  Using brokers, other 
salespersons, and mass-advertising methods (media advertisements, direct 
mailings), the industry has successfully called to the attention of potential 
shareholders the advantages of equity investing, using mutual funds as the 
vehicle. This probably accounts for a large part of the industry’s dramatic 
growth in assets and its access to scale economies. At the same time, mar- 
keting itself adds substantially to costs. 
The major marketing expense incurred by shareholders consists of sales 
commissions. Over two-thirds of all funds are sold through third parties 
(brokers, insurance agents, financial planners) who receive some kind of 
commission (through front or deferred loads or annual 12bl fees). How- 
ever, the proportion of assets managed as no loads through direct market- 
ing is larger and has been increasing through time (table 3.10). 
How much do marketing fees add to total expenses? It is possible that 
sales commissions may  substitute for other costs, such as advertising or 
communication  costs.  Our  regressions,  however,  show  little  trade-off. 
Most of the 12bl fee is passed on to consumers as an additional cost. A 
low 12bl fee (usually 0.25 percent), which is included in the expense ratio, 
Fixed R&C Costs per Account Table 3.10  Marketing Expenses of U.S. Mutual Funds 
Unweighted  Weighted 
1992  1997  1992  1997 
Prevalence of commissions (% of total 
funds): 
Funds with 12bl fees 
Funds with front load 
Funds with deferred load 
Funds with no load or 12bl fee 
Expenses as YV of assets (all funds): 
Average 12bl fee 
Average annualized front load 
Reported expense ratio 
Brokerage fees (trading costs) 
Total expenses 
Marketing expenses as YO  of total expenses 
Expenses as % of assets (funds with either 
12bl or front load): 
Average 12bl fee 
Average front load 
Reported expense ratio 
Brokerage fees 
Total investor cost ratio 
Marketing expenses as % of total expenses 
Expenses as % of assets (funds without 12bl 
or front load)? 
Average 12bl fee 
Average front load 
Reported expense ratio 
Brokerage fees 





















































































Note; Average  brokerage  fees  are  taken  from  a  subset  of  funds  for  which  they  were 
available. 
For 12bl fee, front load, and total expenses, see table 3.5 and n. 8 above. Deferred load is 
a back-loaded sales charge that is paid to the distributor by investors. Usually, the deferred 
load falls as a function of time the shares are held; therefore, the average deferred load paid 
by  investors ends up being small (but we do not have precise data). Neither front load nor 
deferred load are included in the fund's expense ratio since they are paid by the shareholder, 
not the fund. 
Annual marketing expenses are defined here as 12bl fee + 0.2 (front load). 0.2 is annu- 
alized front load for reasons given in n. 8 above. 
This table overstates marketing expenses if investors hold their front-loaded shares longer 
than assumed or if the discount rate is lower than assumed. On the other hand, given that 
deferred load is excluded (on the grounds that most people hold their  investments long 
enough to avoid most of the deferred load) and advertising costs are excluded (because they 
are not reported), this table probably understates marketing expenses. 
'These funds have no explicit marketing expenses in the form of sales commissions. Adver- 
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raises the expense ratio by 0.2 percent, a high 12bl fee (usually 1 percent) 
raises it by 0.4 percent, and the latter is usually found together with a de- 
ferred load, which raises it another 0.5 percent, implying that most of the 
12bl fee is an added cost. A front load (a one-time sales fee of 4-5  percent) 
that is paid by  investors directly to brokers does not reduce the reported 
expense ratio paid by  the fund. (For corroboration  of the cost-raising 
effects of  sales loads, see Ferris and Chance [1987] and Trzcinka and 
Zweig 119901.) 
If we define total annual marketing cost (paid by the shareholder) as the 
12bl fee plus the annualized front load, it is 0.61 percent of assets-43 
percent of all fund expenses (table 3. lo). This is very similar to the market- 
ing proportion of total cost in Chile’s AFP system. For funds with front 
loads or 12bl fees, total investor costs are over 1 percentage point higher 
than for funds that pay no sales commission, and more than half of total 
investor expenses can be attributed to marketing costs. These numbers 
undoubtedly understate true marketing costs as they do not include the 
salaries of the staff who manage the marketing efforts or the advertising 
costs that are paid for out of the adviser’s fee. Marketing costs played an 
even more important role in the early years of the mutual fund industry, 
before no loads developed. 
Investors have the option, of course, to purchase no loads. This implies 
that, rightly or wrongly, they believe that they receive value from the third- 
party intermediaries with whom they deal. (For corroboration, see Kihn 
[1996], and Capon, Fitzsimmons, and Prince [1996].) From a social point 
of view, marketing probably provides a mixture of useful information, mis- 
leading information,  an impetus  to good  performance, and zero-sum 
game raiding. Other studies have shown that the funds that have gained 
the most are those that combine vigorous marketing with good perfor- 
mance (Sirri and Tufano 1997). The possibility of spreading favorable in- 
formation by marketing probably acts as a spur to good performance and 
product innovation. Nevertheless, most methods to keep IA costs low in- 
volve a reduction in marketing expenses, under the assumption that it is 
zero or negative sum and not the most efficient way to provide useful infor- 
mation to new investors. 
3.3.6 
A small number of mutual funds or special classes within a large mutual 
fund are limited to institutional investors (i.e., bank trust departments, 
corporations, small pension funds, etc.). Usually, the minimum investment 
for these funds is $100,000 or higher. These funds have a significantly 
lower expense ratio as compared with funds for individual investors. The 
same assets can be amassed with much lower marketing and R&C costs 
from one large institution than from numerous small individuals. Institu- 
tions are much less likely to pay  12bl (or front-loaded) fees to brokers 
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because they have more efficient ways of gathering information. On the 
rare occasions when they do pay these fees, they obtain lower rates. As a 
result, the expense ratio of institutional funds is 0.6 percent lower than 
that of other funds in the regression specifications where sales commis- 
sions are not controlled, and the total investor cost (as a percentage of 
assets) for the average institutional  fund is less than half that for retail 
funds (table 3.11). 
Some funds have an initial investment requirement that is  high (over 
$10,000), albeit not as high as that for institutions. These funds also have 
a significantly lower expense ratio (0.4 percent) than funds that cater to 
smaller investors, albeit not quite as low as institutional funds. These ob- 
servations led us to investigate the institutional market in greater detail in 
order to determine whether IAs could also benefit from the low expense 
ratios that would result from the large aggregate amounts in the manda- 
tory system. 
3.3.7 
Also important is  the significant negative sign on passively managed 
funds, known as index funds, which do not have to pay the high fees that 
popular active managers command. Passively managed funds mimic or 
replicate a stated benchmark, such as the Standard and Poor’s 500 or the 
Russell 2000. The manager does not engage in discretionary stock selec- 
tion or market timing and therefore cannot claim a fee for superior infor- 
mation  or judgment.  Index funds generally benefit  from low  turnover, 
which reduces the expense ratio as well as brokerage fees. Their high corre- 
lation with the market (low nonsystematic risk) means that they are less 
likely to engage in heavy marketing and more likely to rely on price (cost) 
competition (see below). In the regressions, expense ratios of index funds 
are 0.5 percent less than those of other funds. On average, their fees are 
less than one-third those of actively managed funds in the retail market 
(table 3.1 1). Better-informed institutional managers realize this and hold 
a disproportionate share of index funds. 
The low cost of index funds should be interpreted with some caution, 
however. It could mean that fund complexes view these funds as the prod- 
ucts that are designed to capture price-sensitive consumers, and, for this 
reason, they may allocate much of their joint expenses (advertising, new 
product  development) to the  other members of  their  complex.l0 R&C 
charges also tend to be less for passively than for actively managed funds; 
this may be a business-strategy decision rather than a reflection of real 
cost differentials. The real cost savings to the economy and the poten- 
tial savings in a mandatory IA system from index funds may therefore be 
Lower Costs of Passive Management-for  Some Assets 
10. For example, in  1998-99  Fidelity waived  part of its normal management  fee on its 
Standard and Poor’s 500 index funds in order to make them more competitive. Table 3.11  Institutional versus Retail Mutual Funds: Average Expense Ratios and Total Investor Cost as Percentage of Assets, 1997 
A. Expense Ratio-Unweighted 
All  Active  Passive 
All  Retail  Institutional  Retail  Institutional  Retail  Institutional 
Domestic stock funds  1.43  1.47  0.91  1  .so  0.98  0.71  0.37 
Domestic bond funds  1.08  1.12  0.62  1.12  0.62  0.65  0.35 
International stock funds  1.69  1.75  1.09  1.77  1.15  0.95  0.66 
Emerging market funds  2.12  2.19  1.39  2.21  1.39  0.57 
All funds in universe  1.28  1.31  0.79  1.33  0.81  0.72  0.42 
B. Expense Ratio-Weighted  by Assets 
Domestic stock funds  0.93  0.94  0.51  0.99  0.85  0.31  0.19 
Domestic bond funds  0.80  0.82  0.53  0.82  0.54  0.25  0.31 
International stock funds  1.18  1.19  0.96  1.20  0.97  0.42  0.68 
Emerging market funds  1.75  1.77  1.25  1.81  1.25  0.57  0.00 
All funds in universe  0.91  0.93  0.56  0.96  0.69  0.31  0.20 
C. Total Investor Cost, Including Annualized Front Loads and Brokerage Fees-Weighted  by  Assets 
Domestic stock funds  1.44  1.47  0.63  1.55  0.97  0.35  0.22 
Domestic bond funds  1.30  1.35  0.65  1.36  0.65  0.29  0.34 
International stock funds  1.83  1.87  1.08  1.89  1.09  0.45  0.71 
Emerging market funds  2.29  2.33  1.37  2.38  1.37  0.60 
All funds in universe  1.43  1.48  0.68  1.52  0.71  0.35  0.23 
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overstated by our regression results. If index funds become a larger share 
of the total market, opportunities for cost saving and cost shifting may 
decline. Finally, in separate regressions by  asset class, the lower costs of 
index funds were not statistically significant for small-cap and emerging 
market funds. This suggests that IA systems in large-cap stock and bond 
markets in industrialized countries can keep their costs down and increase 
their net returns by using index funds, although this effect may be smaller 
than indicated by these regressions and less true of developing and transi- 
tional countries, where emerging markets and small-cap stocks dominate. 
Passive investment strategies would have the additional  advantage in a 
mandatory system of reducing the variance in returns among participants. 
3.3.8  Asset Allocation: International Funds 
Asset allocation has a major effect on costs. The dummy variables for 
asset classes have large significant effects-although  the total R2  does not 
change much in comparison with the core group. Bond funds have lower 
costs, and small-cap or specialty funds have higher costs. Expenses are 
highest in international  funds, especially emerging market  funds-as  a 
result of their smaller size, the greater difficulty in obtaining information 
in these countries, their high bid-ask spreads, transactions and custodial 
costs, currency-hedging costs, and the relative paucity of  effective cost- 
saving passive investment opportunities. If brokerage fees and price im- 
pact were taken into account, this would increase their expenses still fur- 
ther. These factors would also apply to local funds operating in emerging 
markets, although such institutions need not hedge against domestic cur- 
rency risk and may have an informational advantage over those that are 
based in a foreign country. It follows that IA systems in industrialized 
countries such as the United States can economize on costs if they concen- 
trate investments in large liquid domestic instruments and that interna- 
tional diversification comes at the expense of higher costs. In contrast, 
developing countries are likely to have higher costs for domestic invest- 
ments-although  this effect could be mitigated for them by international 
diversification. 
3.3.9  Brokerage Fees 
Brokerage fees paid for securities transactions average 0.26 percent of 
assets for the subset of funds in  our sample that  included these data. 
Weighted by  assets, average annual brokerage fees fall to 0.12 percent. 
Recall that these fees are not included in the reported expense ratio but 
are deducted from gross returns and are therefore part of total investor 
cost. Separate regressions on this subset show that, as do other expenses, 
brokerage fees exhibit economies of scale with respect to assets as large 
fund families use internal trading and spread the fixed costs of electronic 
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funds, especially in emerging markets, and they are, of course, strongly 
dependent on securities turnover rates.IL 
3.3.10  Net Returns, Gross Returns, and Risk 
Of course, the investor ultimately cares about net returns, not the ex- 
pense incurred in earning them. If higher costs led to higher returns, they 
would be worth incurring. However, a large literature indicates that this is 
not the case (see Carhart 1997; Elton, Gruber, and Hlavka 1993; Malkiel 
1995; Malhotra and McLeod 1997; Washington  Post, 13 September 1998, 
Bl). While this paper focuses on costs, we  also carried out regressions on 
net and gross returns for 1992-97.  These indicate that some of the same 
factors that  increase costs actually reduced returns  during this period 
(James et al. 1999). 
Most important, larger assets under management increase both gross 
and net returns, although this effect stops after a point. Funds with front- 
loaded fees do not earn higher gross returns, so their load-adjusted net 
returns are lower than are those of no loads. Index funds earn significantly 
more than actively managed funds, overall, particularly in the large-cap 
stock and bond markets, but  specifications that were  disaggregated by 
asset class indicate that this effect is absent in the small-cap, international, 
and emerging market funds (see also Muralidhar and Weary 1998; and 
Shah and Fernandes 1999). Institutional funds have higher gross and net 
returns. 
These results from separate equations and previous literature are consis- 
tent with the negative sign on gross and net returns as a control variable 
in  our expense-ratio equations. Cost and returns, especially net returns, 
appear to be negatively correlated. Thus, strategies involving high admin- 
istrative costs do not seem to be justified on the grounds that they raise re- 
turns. 
3.3.1  1  Changes over Time: Will Price 
Competition Reduce Investor Costs? 
The question of  whether expense ratios have been going up or down 
over time has been hotly debated (see Lipper 1994). This is an important 
question because it tells us whether policy makers can rely  on market 
forces to reduce costs. In our regression analysis for 1992-97,  time has a 
I 1. The typical brokerage fees paid by mutual funds apparently exceed the “best execution 
fees” charged by deep-discount brokers or commissions paid by large institutional investors 
by  a factor of three or four (see Livingston and O’Neal 1996; and table 3.12 below). One 
possible reason is that brokerage fees are not included in the expense ratio, which is the most 
widely reported expense figure. They were not even disclosed until 1996. Reported expenses 
could be reduced by covering some research and marketing services out of transactions fees 
paid to brokers-the  controversial soft-dollar issue. It will be interesting to see whether dis- 
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small significant positive effect on the reported expense ratio (one to two 
basis points per year), after controlling for all our other variables. 
These estimates do not take into account changes in sales commissions 
that are included in the total investor-cost ratio but not in the reported 
fund-expense ratio. Between 1992 and 1997, a shift of investors toward no 
loads and a decrease in the size of front loads led to a small fall in the total 
investor-cost ratio, despite the rise in the reported expense ratio (table 3.10 
above). Over a longer time period  (1 980-97),  the average investor-cost 
ratio has fallen more substantially (by about one-third), for the same rea- 
sons (Rea and Reid 1998). But the picture remains mixed because the total 
dollar cost per account (expense ratio times average assets per account) 
has gone up dramatically over the same period, primarily as a result of 
asset growth and secondarily as a result of the rise in nonmarketing ex- 
penses. More recently, investors have been shifting into cheaper passively 
managed funds, but, in 1997, these still held only 6 percent of all assets. 
The movement to lower-cost and better-performing funds generally oc- 
curs through the flow of new money to the funds rather than the realloca- 
tion of old money. The process, therefore, has been very gradual, and some 
poorly informed investors have not participated in it (Ippolito 1992; Patel, 
Zeckhauser, and Hendricks  1994; Sirri and Tufano 1997; Gruber  1996). 
The slowness may be due, in part, to the generally robust stock market 
since 1980. Costs have been small relative to returns, and the vast majority 
of investors in diversified mutual funds have fared well, even those in high- 
cost funds. Costs may  become more important as a determinant of  net 
returns  and  peoples’ investment decisions when  gross returns  decline. 
Nevertheless, it appears that, in the short run, we cannot count on compe- 
tition to bring price down for the individual investor. 
Why is this the case? We hypothesize that competition through market- 
ing rather than through price cuts may be a consequence of volatility com- 
bined with the nonseparability between cost and benefit in equity markets 
(where the “benefit” is the net return and the “cost” is one of the ingredi- 
ents of net return).’* High volatility creates a high noise-to-signal ratio 
that makes it difficult for investors to distinguish between random luck 
versus skill and low costs that are likely to repeat, in predicting net returns, 
and leads funds to spend on marketing rather than to cut price. A small 
example will illustrate this point. 
Suppose a fund manager has a low expense ratio that, ceteris paribus, 
leads to an alpha (i.e., a net return above the fair return given the risk 
involved) that is 0.1 percent per month or 1.2 percent per year. This incre- 
12. In financial markets, consumers are basically purchasing an expected net return, which 
equals the gross return minus the expense ratio. They will be willing to pay a higher expense 
ratio (price) if this is correlated with higher gross and net returns, and stock market volatility 
enables some high-cost funds to argue that this is the case (even though our regressions show 
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ment to net return will ultimately increase accumulations of lifetime inves- 
tors by  24 percent, but, given the volatility of the portfolio, it is realized 
with a monthly standard deviation (of the nonsystematic risk) of  1 per- 
cent. In any given month or year, some other managers will outperform 
this manager, although, over time, he will  outperform the market. How 
do investors distinguish the true ability of  this manager to yield excess 
returns over the long run, owing to his lower costs, from the random short- 
run gains that accrue to other managers? If  we  take each month as an 
independent observation, regress this fund’s return on the market return, 
and are fortunate enough to secure the true alpha as the estimated alpha, 
384 observations, or almost twenty years, are needed to convince investors 
that this alpha is significantly higher than zero, at the 5 percent signifi- 
cance 
In the intervening years, other funds will  be advertising their perfor- 
mance,  choosing some convenient time  period  when  they experienced 
above-average returns, and arguing that these superior returns more than 
justify their higher fees. Given the wide divergence between price and mar- 
ginal cost in the industry and the fertile possibilities for shaping informa- 
tion in a favorable way, each fund has an incentive to spend substantially 
on marketing to increase the assets under its management. The prolifera- 
tion of new funds that are kept alive if they randomly experience high re- 
turns at their beginning exacerbates the difficulty in separating noise from 
signal and the long time periods needed to do so. In view of these calcula- 
tions, it is not surprising that it has taken no loads twenty years to gain 
barely half the market and that low-cost index funds are still only a tiny 
fraction of the market. 
The more volatile the fund-specific returns and the greater the product 
(portfolio) differentiation, the more difficult it is to isolate true cost savings 
from random luck; we  would expect marketing expenses to play a larger 
role relative to price competition in these circumstances. Bank deposits 
and money market funds, therefore, would be expected to depend less on 
marketing and more on price competition, and the same is true of bond 
and equity index funds. The movement toward low-cost funds might accel- 
erate with a mandatory IA system that includes many low-income inves- 
tors who are interested in low cost. But, more basically, when returns are 
volatile, true cost saving that yields higher long-run returns cannot be dis- 
tinguished from short-run random luck until many years of  observations 
have elapsed. This poses a problem for IA systems as an entire generation 
of workers may pass through the system before low-cost, high-performing 
funds have been identified. The difficulty that small investors have in pro- 
cessing financial information will  only exacerbate this situation. An IA 
system that constrains investment options to funds with low nonsystem- 
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atic risk will encourage price competition relative to marketing competi- 
tion because such funds will be able to demonstrate their cost-based supe- 
riority more quickly than funds with greater fund-specific volatility. 
3.4  Costs in the Institutional Market 
Mutual funds are limited in their ability to charge lower fees for large 
investors. Regulations require funds to charge all investors the same ex- 
pense ratio-unless  they create separate classes of shares that incur dif- 
ferent expenses. Thus, institutional investor classes are usually not charged 
for shareholder services or distribution because it can be demonstrated 
that they do not incur these costs, but they are charged for a pro rata share 
of the investment adviser and other fees. This treatment makes it possible 
for mutual funds to compete for small institutional accounts (e.g., of $1- 
$20 million, owned by bank trust departments or corporations). However, 
it puts them at a disadvantage when competing for larger accounts. Larger 
institutions (e.g., defined-benefit [DB] plans of major corporations and 
public employers) can get better rates elsewhere. 
3.4.1  How Much Do Institutional Investors 
Pay for Asset Management? 
Table  3.12 presents illustrative sliding-scale data on costs of  money 
management provided by a large manager of assets for institutions. It also 
shows median costs for 167 large and 10 of the largest U.S. pension funds 
(median large fund = $1.5 billion; median assets per money manager = 
$1 13 million; median largest fund = $42 billion; median assets per money 
manager = $543 million). These rates show clear evidence of scale econo- 
mies, the cost efficiency of passive management, and the effect of asset al- 
location. 
Fees as a percentage of assets decline over large ranges with volume 
of assets managed. Marginal fees are as low as 1 basis point for passive 
management of large-cap stocks and 2.5 basis points for small and mid 
caps, once assets in an account reach $200 million. Fees for active manage- 
ment are higher but still far less than mutual fund rates. For large-cap 
domestic equity exceeding $25 million, investors must pay 35 to 50 basis 
points. Not surprisingly, fees for emerging market investments are much 
higher than those for domestic investments, but advantages to large insti- 
tutional investors remain. For active management, they pay a marginal fee 
of 0.8 percent and, for index funds, only 0.4 percent. The largest pension 
funds pay still less. But even these funds use multiple money managers (an 
average of thirty-four) and allocate less than $1 billion on average to each 
active manager, evidence that diversification benefits eventually outweigh 
scale economies. There appears to be no strong cost reason for aggregat- 
ing assets per manager beyond $1 billion. Table 3.12  Marginal and Average Asset-Management Fees for Institutional 
Investors: How They Vary with Amount of Investment (in basis points) 
Large  Small and 
Cap  Mid Cap 
Passive domestic equity: 
< $5 million 
$5-$10  million 
$10-$25  million 
$25-$100  million 
$100-$200  million 
Balance 
Average fee for $100 million 
Average fee for $500 million 
Median cost, large US. pension funds" 
Median cost, largest US. pension fundsb 
20.0  25.0 
10.0  15.0 
8.0  10.0 
6.0  7.5 
3.0  5.0 
1 .o  2.5 
7.2  9.1 
2.6  4.3 
4.0  7.0 
1  .o  6.0 
Value  Growth  Small Cap 
Active domestic equity: 
< $5 million 
$5-$25  million 
Balance 
Average fee for $100 million 
Average fee for $500 million 
Median cost, large pension funds 
Median cost, largest pension funds 
65.0  80.0  100.0 
35.0  80.0  100.0 
35.0  50.0  100.0 
36.5  57.5  100.0 
35.3  51.5  100.0 
37.0  69.0 
25.0  55.0 
Index  Active 
International equity: 
< $10 million 
$10-$25  milion 
$25-$40  million 
$40-$50  million 
$50-$100  million 
Balance 
Average fee for $100 million 
Average fee for $500 million 
Median cost, large pension funds 
Median cost, largest pension funds 
Emerging market: 
< $50 million 
Balance 
Average fee for $100 million 
Average fee for $500 million 
Median cost, large pension funds 
Median cost, largest pension funds 
< $25 million 
$25-$50  million 
$50-$100  million 
Balance 
Average fee for $100 milion 
(continued) 
Fixed income: 
25.00  90.0 
25.00  70.0 
20.00  70.0 
20.00  60.0 
15.00  60.0 
10.00  60.0 
18.75  66.0 
11.75  61.2 
12.00  54.0 
8.00  34.0 
40  100 
40  80 
40  90 
40  82 
23  77 
12  70 
12.0  30 
8.0  24 
5.0  17 
3.0  12 
7.5  22 116  Estelle James, Gary Ferrier, James Smalhout, and Dimitri Vittas 
Table 3.12  (continued) 
Index  Active 
Average fee for $500 million  3.9  14 
Median cost, large pension funds  6.0  24 





Internal administrative costs: 
Median cost, large pension funds 
Median cost, largest pension funds 
Median cost, large pension funds 
Median cost, largest pension funds 





Note: Sliding-scale fees for institutional commingled funds, the BT Pyramid funds, were 
graciously supplied by  Bankers Trust, a large money manager of indexed and actively man- 
aged institutional funds. Data on large U.S. pension funds is from CEM (1997). 
aThese are median costs of external money management for given type of assets, reported 
by  167 large U.S. pension funds ranging in size from less than $100 million to over $100 
billion. Median fund = $1.5 billion. Average of 14 external money managers per fund, man- 
aging $194 million each; median amount managed per manager = $1  13 million. 
bThese are median costs for the 10 largest U.S. pension funds, excluding Calpers, ranging in 
size from $29 to $65 billion. Average of 34 external money managers per fund managing 
$646 million each ($543 million median). 
'This includes brokerage (trading) costs plus internal administrative costs of money manage- 
ment,  such  as executive pay,  consultants, performance  measurement,  custodial arrange- 
ments, trustees, and audits. The breakdown by passive and active is not available, but broker- 
age costs are estimated to be much lower for passive. 
If we add to these asset-management costs another 3 to 10 basis points 
for brokerage fees and internal administrative costs that are incurred by 
large institutions, this brings the total cost to 0.04-0.65  percent, depend- 
ing on investment strategy. This may be compared with retail costs ranging 
from 0.3 percent to 1.5 percent for the average passively and actively man- 
aged mutual fund, respectively, 
3.4.2 
In an imperfectly competitive market, large investors have greater rea- 
sons and resources to seek out asset managers who will provide good per- 
formance at low cost. They are better able to separate noise from signal, 
to evaluate whether a particular fee is warranted by the expected returns, 
and, therefore, to respond sensibly to price differentials. They also have 
the credible threat of managing their money in house if they do not get 
good terms from an external manager. Thus, if marginal costs are less than 
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average because of fixed costs, to attract an institutional investor the asset 
manager is likely to charge only a small fee above marginal cost per unit 
invested; this adds up to a large contribution toward  total fixed costs 
where large sums are involved. 
Besides possessing greater information and bargaining power, institu- 
tional investors also require lower R&C and marketing costs by  the asset 
manager. It is easier and less labor consuming for the asset manager to 
deal with the financial staff at a few large institutions than with numerous 
small, uninformed households. To reach individual retail investors, adver- 
tising expenses must be incurred, numerous brochures and statements sent 
to households,  and  follow-up with  personal  communications must  be 
made to convince them to invest and to choose a particular fund. Often, 
commissions are paid to motivate sales agents to spend the time and effort 
needed to carry out this task. In contrast, marketing in the institutional 
marketplace is likely to consume fewer resources because of the concentra- 
tion of investors, their greater financial expertise, and their price sensitiv- 
ity; sales commissions are rare. And, once the contract is secured, only 
one investor need be served in the institutional market. Even if the billion- 
dollar investor gets better service than the thousand-dollar investor (as is 
likely the case), total R&C demands relative to assets are much smaller 
for one institution than for a million small investors. 
These factors lead to costs for institutional investors as low as 0.04-0.65 
percent  of  assets, depending on asset category and investment strategy 
chosen. These would be the costs in a centrally managed social security 
fund-if  it is well run. 
3.5  Capturing Institutional Rates for a Mandatory CA  System: 
Constrained Choice 
Mandatory IA systems can also be structured to obtain scale economies 
in asset management without high marketing costs. In other words, they 
can offer workers an opportunity to invest at much lower cost than would 
be possible on a voluntary basis. To accomplish this requires aggregating 
numerous small accounts  of  a mandatory  system into large blocks of 
money and negotiating fees on a centralized basis, through a competitive 
bidding process with limited entry or open entry with price ceilings. Lim- 
ited entry avoids high start-up costs in the early years of a new system. 
Low  fees create a disincentive for high marketing expenses. The lowest 
fees are obtained when worker choice is constrained to low-cost invest- 
ment portfolios and strategies, such as passive investment. Still, enough 
choice could be retained to satisfy individual preferences and avoid politi- 
cal control. We  call this an institutional approach to IAs or a system of 
constrained choice. (For a description of constrained-choice systems in Bo- 
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3.5.1  How Would It Work? 
The exact number of asset managers in  a constrained-choice system 
would  depend  on the  volume  of  contributions as  well  as  the  desired 
amount of choice per worker. Initially, the number might range from two 
to three in countries with a small contribution base to five to ten in larger 
countries. This number would gradually increase with the growth of assets 
in the system. If a competitive bidding process is used, as in Bolivia, issues 
related to the auction process include selection criteria, term of contract, 
frequency of rebidding, and fee structure (performance based, asset based, 
or otherwise). For  countries  with  weak  financial markets,  an auction 
would provide an incentive-a  guaranteed  or quasi-guaranteed market 
share-for  international companies with financial expertise to enter the 
industry. To produce this outcome, these countries would need to avoid 
the temptation to corrupt or politically manipulate the bidding process. 
Initially, the options might be restricted to a variety of passive invest- 
ment choices indexed to different diversified benchmarks. Again, this may 
not be feasible or desirable in developing countries where such bench- 
marks do not exist, asset holdings are concentrated and illiquid, the rapid 
entry of  new  firms makes it difficult to build a stable benchmark,  and 
inefficient markets give an edge to active managers who can obtain private 
information. But, where feasible, the bidding process and passive invest- 
ment  strategies would help avoid high start-up costs and large expense 
deductions from small accounts. 
Later, as aggregate assets increase, entry could be opened up to a larger 
number of asset managers, including active managers who agree to operate 
below a specified price ceiling. The ceiling would be set high enough to 
cover marginal cost plus part of fixed costs but low enough to discourage 
marketing  expenses-not  an easy  target  to achieve. It might vary  ac- 
cording to benchmark chosen: higher for small caps and emerging market 
portfolios than for domestic large caps. (If only one price ceiling is set, 
this is tantamount to restricting the available portfolios and strategies to 
those that are profitable at low cost.) For example, the ceiling might be set 
at the mean  or median money-management cost, by  asset class, of the 
largest pension funds in the country. R&C services would be provided else- 
where to keep small accounts attractive to asset managers and to avoid ser- 
vice deterioration under incomplete contracts. The Swedish system of fee 
ceilings moves directly to this second stage: it involves numerous mutual 
funds and centralized R&C. This scheme is also consistent with the two- 
tiered plan for the United States outlined in Goldberg and Graetz (chap. 
1 in this volume). Their plan would initially give workers a choice among 
six index funds (SPIFs, or simple personal investment funds) but would 
allow workers to opt out into a broader set of qualified options (Q-funds, 
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3.5.2  Marketing Expenses 
One intended consequence of  this method that accounts for much of 
the cost saving is reduced marketing expenditures. Limited entry and low 
fees reduce the incentive for marketing. Given the large fixed costs and 
declining average costs in the industry, it will always be tempting for funds 
to spend more on advertising and sales commissions to increase their mar- 
ket share so long as the attainable fee is higher than marginal cost. When 
the fee is decreased, the incentive to spend on marketing will  similarly 
decline, and this helps sustain the low fee. 
Is this attempt to reduce marketing expenses efficient? This depends on 
whether the cuts come mainly from the informational content of market- 
ing or its zero-sum game competitive elements. It seems likely that the 
socially optimal amount of marketing is less in a mandatory IA system 
than in the voluntary market. First, since the total investable amount is 
predetermined by  law, marketing is not needed to induce people to save 
or to invest in financial markets. Second, mandatory centralized collec- 
tions can aggregate savings into large blocs for efficient investment with- 
out marketing expenses. Third, while information is imparted by market- 
ing, investment companies and brokers have a clear incentive to impart 
misleading information that is in their rather than the consumer’s interest. 
For example, broker-salespeople may lead clients to “their” funds rather 
than to the “best” or the “least-cost’’ funds. This could be a big problem in 
a new mandatory system with many small, inexperienced investors. Such a 
system should include other, more cost-effective ways to impart less biased 
information relevant to investment choices, such as government publica- 
tions and the popular media. The incentives for good performance and 
innovation imparted by marketing could continue to be provided in the 
voluntary marketplace. Reducing marketing expenses may be less efficient 
in countries with low  tax-collection capacities and fewer sources of in- 
formation, particularly those that wish to use marketing as a tool to in- 
crease coverage and reduce evasion. However, for others, the potential 
savings from cutting marketing costs seems to be about 0.4-0.5  percent 
of assets. 
3.5.3 
A second consequence of this cost-cutting method is restricted choice 
regarding investment portfolios and strategies. The institutional approach 
to IA systems limits the range of options available to workers in order to 
obtain better rates from fund managers. In developed financial markets, 
this is likely to mean ruling out expensive portfolios in illiquid assets such 
as small-cap stocks and foreign emerging markets and directing workers 
toward index funds in liquid domestic instruments instead. The Thrift Sav- 
ings Plan (TSP) in the United States does this directly. Sweden’s new IA 
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system does  it indirectly by  setting price ceilings that  will  restrict  the 
supply of “expensive” funds and cross-subsidies that will push consumers 
toward cheaper funds. In James, Smalhout, and Vittas (1999), we  show 
that most of the cost saving achieved by these systems is due to the portfo- 
lio and strategy changes that they require or induce. 
Constraining investment choice in  this manner has certain disadvan- 
tages. It increases the probability of corruption or collusion and decreases 
the adaptability  to individual risk-return  preferences-although  not as 
much as a single centralized fund. Individuals may have a smaller sense of 
“ownership” and a larger sense of being taxed if their choice of investment 
manager is constrained. The risk to the government of being responsible 
for a bailout  in case of investment failure may  be greater when  it has 
“endorsed” or participated in the process of choosing a small number of 
asset managers. The constraint on choice and these consequent dangers 
would be particularly great in countries with a small contribution base 
and a tradition of inefficient government control. Greater choice could be 
allowed, and hence the trade-off between low cost and low political risk 
would be less serious, in economies with larger investable resources-from 
higher contribution rates or wages. As we have seen, a large country such 
as the United States could allow considerable choice, and Sweden plans 
to allow substantial choice. 
Constrained choice has an additional value at the start of a new system. 
It facilitates learning by doing, which is probably the most effective form 
of education, by  limiting the mistakes that  people can make. It makes 
government guarantees of  benefits potentially less costly by diminishing 
moral hazard problems. Constrained  choice can represent an efficiency 
gain if these advantages, together with the real cost reduction, are valued 
by participants more than the flexibility that they would have had in retail 
markets. This is most likely to be the case if the constraints on choice are 
not too great. 
We estimate that asset-management costs in this system of constrained 
choice would be similar to those in a single centralized fund-0.04-0.65 
percent of assets, depending on the range of strategies allowed-with  a 
small addition for advertising costs. R&C costs would, however, be consid- 
erably larger in an IA system since numerous individual accounts, rather 
than one big pension fund, would have to be tracked. We  move on now 
to discuss how this could be handled in a cost-effective manner. 
3.5.4  How to Keep R&C Costs Low 
While R&C costs are a small component of total costs in mutual funds, 
they are likely to be a relatively larger cost component in an IA system 
that has successfully cut its marketing and investment expenses. The mag- 
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Table 3.13  Transfer Agent (R&C) Costs in Dollars per Account 
1991  1993  1995 
Cost per account 
80 percent range 




If money market 
If sales through affiliated broker 
If direct markethetail 
If dividends paid annually 
If dividends paid monthly 


































Source: ICI and Coopers Lybrand (1995, 1997). 
of level and types of services provided, rather than an exogenously given 
variable. In this section, we  consider some of the policy choices that can 
keep R&C costs low. 
According to periodic surveys of transfer agents (i.e., the organizations 
that provide these services for mutual funds), average mutual fund cost 
per account and per open account has been quite constant, at $21 and 
$25 per account, respectively (table 3.13). However, they are not uniform 
across all funds. They tend to be lower for funds that contract out the 
transfer-agent function rather than performing it internally. This may re- 
sult because pricing in internal arrangements is not an arm’s-length com- 
petitive transaction  and because internal control is designed to provide 
more personalized service, to inculcate loyalty to the fund. Costs per ac- 
count are 33 percent higher for money market than for equity funds be- 
cause of the greater transaction volume and check-writing facilities offered 
by  the former. They are twice as high for direct market retail funds as 
for funds that sell through brokers, who perform some of the customer- 
communications functions that are otherwise provided by  the fund ($33 
vs.  $17). Transfer-agent costs are 20 percent higher for accounts where 
dividends are paid monthly rather than annually. Size of account does not 
appear as a factor influencing R&C costs. 
Competition in the U.S. mutual fund industry has resulted in a high and 
expensive level of  R&C service, in part because shareholder service and 
building shareholder loyalty (a form of marketing) are closely intertwined. 
Service innovations include the ability to make frequent  telephone ex- 
changes, to wire funds, to write checks, and to speak to a representative 
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the costs are hidden.I4 They are free of charge to the individual user- 
although, of course, not to users as a group. 
Despite these incremental costs for each transaction, the most common 
method that transfer agents use for charging funds is a flat fee per account. 
Mutual funds, in turn, rarely charge shareholders special fees for check 
writing, exchanges, or telephone  inquiries (ICI  and  Coopers  Lybrand 
1995, 1997). This is due in part to the cost of measuring and charging for 
transactions and in part to the strong desire of funds to avoid antagonizing 
high-asset consumers. The net result is a cross-subsidy from nonusers to 
heavy users and the absence of incentives for shareholders to economize 
on these services. A lower basic service level, with incremental services 
available at a charge, may be appropriate for a mandatory IA system that 
has many small investors. 
To  accomplish this, the  R&C function  could be  separated from the 
asset-management function and centralized-either  in a public agency or 
in a clearinghouse run jointly by all participating funds or contracted out 
to an independent private company. In fact, the mutual fund industry has 
been moving toward outsourcing the transfer-agent function and concen- 
trating it in two or three large companies. So this would merely accelerate 
and standardize this process. 
Centralization immediately reduces systemwide costs by  avoiding the 
setup and systems-integration problems that occur when members switch 
their accounts from one fund complex to another. It allows workers to 
divide their money among two or more funds without the cost of main- 
taining duplicate records. It keeps a single record of a worker’s  lifetime 
contributions and returns. This is particularly important in a mandatory 
system, where such a record  should be readily available, error free, on 
retirement. The separation of R&C from the asset-management function 
would actually increase the choice of asset managers available to small 
accountholders since R&C costs, which are relatively expensive for such 
accounts, would be covered elsewhere.I5  It would facilitate a cross-subsidy 
14. Processing the application for a new account costs about $10; a personal telephone 
call costs $7; check writing costs $5 to set up and $1 per draft thereafter. Technology (the 
Internet, automated phones) is ostensibly being used to reduce costs, but so far the savings 
have not materialized. Instead, the greatest effect has been to increase investment costs and 
improve service still further. Additional electronic options are available, while the utilization 
of expensive personal services has not diminished. This helps explain why, in the regressions 
for 1992-97,  a period that has seen great technological strides, expense ratios rose slightly 
and total expenses (expense ratio times assets) rose dramatically. 
15. Most mutual funds would not be interested in small IA accounts or would charge them 
a very high annual fee (thereby cutting benefits commensurably) unless some new means is 
developed of handling R&C costs. For the small accounts currently under consideration in 
the United States, average mutual fund fees of 1.4 percent would not cover the real marginal 
R&C cost of the bottom half of the worker population for more than five years. Fees in low- 
priced index funds would not cover these costs for more than twenty years. So these funds 
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to small accounts, which may be socially desirable, without competitive 
pressures that might oppose this. Moreover, centralization would allow 
personalized services to be reduced without generating inefficient compet- 
itive pressures to upgrade. (But note that government capacity and trust 
in public agencies are necessary preconditions for centralized R&C, and 
these are lacking in many developing countries.) 
A second step concerns setting the level of basic service as well as the 
charges for incremental service in an unbundled system. The basic service 
level  should be  low  enough to pass a benefit-cost test, given the small 
average size of  the account for the first few years of  the new  system. It 
should focus on keeping accurate, timely records and processing transac- 
tions efficiently. At the same time, different service levels could be chosen 
by those willing to pay for more. 
For example, services such as check writing could be ruled out, divi- 
dends and capital gains could be credited annually, and fund transfers or 
other transactions could be restricted or discouraged by a fee that covers 
the cost. Most important (because most expensive), personalized services, 
especially telephone discussions with representatives, could be minimized 
by encouraging members to use automated phones or the Internet instead. 
A possible strategy here would be to make telephone service available only 
for limited hours per day and build in probable waiting time to encour- 
age members to switch to automated techniques. Less palatable is the use 
of toll calls instead of 800 numbers to pass the phone-company charges 
on to consumers or the use of 900 numbers to impute the representative’s 
time as well.  Costs could be cut further by  sending statements annually 
instead of quarterly. The costs and performance of each fund could be 
reported in a brief (one- to two-page) summary rather than the lengthy 
and detailed prospectus that is required of all mutual funds today. In fact, 
the short statement may be more educational than the lengthy prospectus, 
which few people read or understand. In-person workshops provided by 
many 401(k) plans would be avoided and replaced by brochures introduc- 
ing investors to concepts such as risk-return trade-offs, diversification, and 
indexing, published for mass distribution. Market competition for high- 
income investors does not allow mutual funds to use these strategies, but 
centralized record keeping in a mandatory system does. 
Additional economies may, in some case, be achieved by piggybacking 
on existing tax-collection facilities. Contributions to IAs could be sent in 
together with other payroll taxes, thereby saving on incremental collection 
costs. This might also facilitate compliance checks, as a central agency 
knows whether the contribution has arrived while a decentralized fund 
may have little reason to report this information to the government accu- 
function is decentralized. They might, however, welcome their asset-management business if 
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Table 3.14  Hypothetical Annual R&C Cost per Account-Breakdown  of 
Services ($) 
Typical Direct  IA System 
Mutual Fund  Records 
Market  with Central 
Account setup (annualized)” 
Annual record keeping and update 
Personal phone callsb 
2 automated phone calls per account 
4 quarterly statements 
1 annual statement or tax statement 
2 transactions with written confirmation 
1 dividend + capital gains distribution 
Distribution of prospectus, semiannual 
Queries and mailing about other funds 
General educational material 
Total 
with statement 
and annual reports 
in complex 
2.00 

















1  .OO* 
1  .ow 
2.50 
16.60 
Source: State Street Bank, mutual fund representatives, and authors’ own calculations. 
assume that the investor switches to a new mutual fund every seven years but would 
stay in the centralized records of an IA system for forty years. 
bWe assume one phone call per year per account in a mutual fund, one-third per account in 
the IA system. 
cPossible fee for additional transactions. 
dDividends  and capital gains are credited to account in the IA system and are included in 
the annual statement. 
‘Two-page statement substitutes for prospectus. 
rately. However, utilizing existing tax agencies must be approached with 
caution as it involves hidden costs such as long delays (as much as nine 
months) before the worker’s contribution is allocated to his or her account 
and money manager. If the new contribution loses, say, an incremental 3 
percent rate of return in the interim, this is equivalent to a loss of  0.15 
percent of assets per year over a worker’s lifetime. Moreover, this approach 
may not be an option for countries that have weak tax-collection mecha- 
nisms and a distrust of public agencies. In these countries, workers may 
be more likely to contribute if  they can put the money directly into their 
own accounts. This was the case, for example, in Chile at the time of its 
reform; only a decentralized approach was feasible under those circum- 
stances. Piggybacking, however, can greatly reduce collection costs as well 
as facilitate compliance and record keeping in countries that have the ca- 
pacity. 
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account and a modest-service account proposed for an IA system that 
exploits all these cost-saving opportunities. It seems likely that collection 
and R&C costs will total less than $20 per account, which is  at the low 
(but not the lowest) end of the mutual fund spectrum.I6 
3.5.5  Comparison with the TSP 
Our $20 figure is also consistent with R&C costs of the TSP, a retire- 
ment savings plan for federal employees in the United States. The TSP 
began in the late 1980s. It now has 2.3 million participants, approximately 
$65 billion in assets, and an average account size of $27,000 (table 3. 15). 
TSP R&C costs have remained fairly stable, at $18-$21  per account, since 
1988, although total administrative costs have increased to $30 per ac- 
count as assets have grown. (These numbers are in 1998 dollars, and they 
cover gross costs, including trading and other investment costs, although 
these are partially offset on TSP books by account forfeitures.) 
R&C costs are low in part because much of  the communication with 
participants takes place through the federal agencies where members are 
employed, at an additional (but unknown) cost. In a mandatory IA sys- 
tem, information would have to be distributed directly from the funds or 
public agencies to the individual, at some monetary cost. However, the 
TSP provides certain expensive services that would not be included in a 
mandatory IA system, such as loans and withdrawals. Moreover, an IA 
system would benefit from much greater economies of scale. For example, 
the TSP numbers given  above include systemwide fixed  administrative 
costs that would disappear per account in the much larger social security 
system. 
But the biggest cost saving for the TSP is due to the constraints that it 
places on portfolio choice and investment strategy: workers must choose 
among a money market fund, an equity fund indexed to the Standard 
and Poor’s 500, and an indexed long- and medium-term bond fund. (For 
comparison, Standard and Poor’s 500 index funds are available in the retail 
16. This $20 figure may be contrasted with the $50 per account figure in Diamond (chap. 
4 in this volume), which is much higher than either the TSP or mutual funds. The $50 number 
is Diamond’s estimate of the political equilibrium, under the assumption that political pres- 
sures will drive up service levels and costs. While we do not try to estimate a political equilib- 
rium-which  is highly subjective-it  should be noted that the equilibrium service level and 
cost can be influenced by process and disclosure. For example, if the charge is prominently 
displayed on the annual statement, if the basic service is financed by cross-subsidization from 
large to small accounts via an asset-based fee, and if services are unbundled so that incre- 
mental services are paid for by  the user, the political equilibrium may result in a relatively 
small common service charge. 
Also, Diamond’s $50 may include some of the costs that we cover in a different category. 
Our total dollar cost for an average account in steady state, including money-management 
and brokerage fees that are tied to money management, is $31-$39  for passive management 
and $106-$172  for active management. These costs would hold when the average account 
size is $22,000 (in 1999 dollars). Table 3.15  Administrative Costs of the Thrift Savings Plan, 1988-98 
Administrative Cost  R&C Cost 
Average Size  per Account  per Account 
Expense Ratio  Account  Investment Cost 
(basis points)  ($thousands)  $  1998 $  per Account ($)  $  1998 $ 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
1988  .70  2.4  16.8  22.7  1  .o  15.8  21.4 
1989  .46  3.1  17.1  22.21  1.5  15.5  20.2 
1990  .29  5.1  14.81  18.00  2.0  12.8  15.6 
1991  .26  6.7  17.4  20.71  2.7  14.7  17.6 
1992  .23  8.5  19.6  22.53  3.4  16.2  18.6 
1993  .19  10.7  20.3  22.81  4.3  16.1  18.0 
1994  .16  12.8  20.6  22.39  5.1  15.4  16.7 
1995  .14  16.5  23.1  24.57  6.6  16.5  17.6 
1996  .13  20.1  26.2  27.01  8.0  18.1  18.7 
1997  .12  25.3  30.3  30.61  10.1  20.2  20.4 
199P  .ll  27.4  30.1  30.10  11.1  19.2  19.2 
Source; TSP publications and authors' calculations. 
Note: Expense ratio in col. 1 is gross expense ratio as reported in TSP publications (before adjustment for forfeitures) plus three basis points imputed by 
authors for brokerage (trading) fees. Cols. 5 and 6 are authors' estimates separating R&C from investment expenses. Investment expenses are assumed to 
be three basis points of trading costs plus one basis point for asset management, custodian, legal, and auditing fees related to investments. R&C costs are 
the remainder. TSP does not report its brokerage costs or breakdown of other expenses between investment and R&C. 
"Based on January-August annualized. Mutual Funds and Institutional Investments  127 
market for twenty-two basis points, but most investors choose higher-cost 
funds.) Moreover, the right to manage these funds has been auctioned off 
to only one company, on a monopoly basis.  Marketing costs therefore 
are virtually absent, and investment costs are minimal-estimated  by  us 
to be four basis points, including brokerage (trading) fees. Total adminis- 
trative costs (including R&C) have fallen to only 0.1 1 percent of assets as 
average account size has grown. (For a more detailed analysis of the TSP, 
see James, Smalhout, and Vittas [1999].) 
3.5.6  Cost Implications for a New IA System 
Suppose that, in the year 2000, the United  States were  to institute a 
similar structure (but preferably with greater choice, corresponding to the 
greater volume of assets in the system) for a mandatory IA system with 
an annual contribution of $500. If this amount were put in escrow pending 
tax reconciliation and establishment of the new information system, three 
to four years of contributions and interest would accumulate before the 
IAs became operative. By  that time, the $20 R&C cost would be only 1 
percent of assets for the average account. Following panel A of table 3.1 
above, in steady state forty years later it would be only nine basis points. 
After adding these nine basis points to the investment cost derived in 
section 3.4 above, the total cost for an IA system based on constrained 
choice is projected to be 0.14-0.18  percent if passively managed or 0.49- 
0.79 percent if actively managed. In constant dollars, the steady-state cost 
for the average-size account would be $3  1-$172.  This cost is much lower 
than  an IA  system run  through  the  retail market  with  unconstrained 
choice among investment portfolios, resulting in a pension accumulation 
that is  15-25  percent larger. It is lower than that of similar portfolios in 
the voluntary market to which individual investors have access, primarily 
owing to reduced marketing and secondarily to bulk buying power and 
no-frills service.” It is slightly more than a single centralized fund would 
17. It may be useful to compare the cost of passive management under constrained choice 
with the cost of the Standard and Poor’s index funds offered by Vanguard and Fidelity to 
individuals and institutions. These are among the lowest-cost mutual funds available, mar- 
keting  themselves to a  cost-conscious  clientele and making  business-strategy  and cost- 
allocation decisions accordiagly. Their marketing expenses are kept low by  the absence of 
12bl fees, front loads, or back loads. The Vanguard institutional fund has a six-basis-point 
expense ratio, and we impute three basis points in brokerage fees, bringing the total cost to 
nine basis points. The Vanguard and Fidelity Standard and Poor’s index funds have an ex- 
pense ratio of nineteen basis points plus an imputed three basis points for brokerage fees, 
bringing the total to twenty-two basis points. (Actually, Fidelity’s fees are higher, but fees 
above nineteen basis points have been waived to enable Fidelity to compete with Vanguard. 
Asset management for Fidelity’s index fund has been contracted out to Banker’s Trust for 
less than one basis point.) 
In contrast, for an IA system under constrained choice, we have estimated a cost of four- 
teen basis points for passive management of large-cap stocks, including brokerage fees. The 
IA system would be five basis points more expensive than the institutional fund because of 
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cost but, in exchange, offers much greater adaptability to individual pref- 
erences and insulation from political risk (table 3.16). 
3.6  Conclusion 
We  started this paper by  asking, What is the most efficient way to set 
up an IA component of a social security system, and how do we compare 
the cost effectiveness of investing social security funds through (1) the re- 
tail market with open entry and choice, (2) the institutional market with 
constrained choice among investment companies,  and (3) a centralized 
fund without IAs or choice? 
The evidence in this paper demonstrates that large cost savings can be 
realized  by  investing  IAs  through  the  institutional  market  with  con- 
strained choice. This would involve moving money in large blocs rather 
than as small individual investments while still giving workers consider- 
able choice among asset managers. In the early years of a new system, a 
competitive bidding process could be used in which a limited number of 
managers are chosen for differentiated portfolios. Subsequently, an open- 
entry process could  be  used  in  which companies agree to restrict  their 
fees in exchange for the right to participate. Further economies might be 
achieved by centralized R&C and collections. The cost savings to partici- 
pants come partly  from reducing marketing expenses, economizing  on 
R&C costs, and exploiting bargaining power regarding the distribution of 
the fixed-cost burden. Limiting investment strategies to passive manage- 
ment in the early phase would produce the largest cost reduction. 
The evidence indicates that many of  the same factors that reduce costs 
will also raise returns. The price paid for lower costs is therefore not lower 
expected returns but rather other, less quantifiable factors, such as greater 
risk  of corruption, collusion, a weaker sense of worker ownership, and 
problems stemming from incomplete contracts. The importance of these 
factors will vary among countries and will decrease as the number of asset 
managers in the system increases. A contribution base that is large enough 
to allow meaningful choice among multiple asset managers, together with 
long-run contestability, will go far toward diminishing these dangers. 
points cheaperthan the index funds for individual investors because of the lower level of 
service provided by centralized R&C, the spreading of fixed costs across a larger asset base, 
and the bulk buying power of large money blocs. 
Importantly, for the first fifteen years of the IA system, most accounts will be below the 
$10,000 minimum investment required by Fidelity and Vanguard for these funds. This mini- 
mum investment was set by  Fidelity and Vanguard precisely because of the R&C cost per 
account (discussed in the text). Smaller investors are either excluded or required to pay an 
additional $10 fee, equivalent to another  ten to one hundred  basis points depending  on 
account size, to help cover R&C. In getting access to a similar index fund without this fee, 
small investors have an investment opportunity under a constrained-choice IA system with 
Centralized R&C that they did not have, or that would have been much more expensive for 
them. in the retail market. Table 3.16  Costs of Retail, Centralized, and Institutional IAs with Constrained Choice Compared (in hasis points per unit of assets unless 
specified otherwise) 
Constrained Choice, 
Retail  Centralized  Institutional 
Passive  Active  Passive  Active  Passive  Active 
Asset management  8  52  1-5  25-55  1-5  25-55 
Marketing  3  65  ...  ...  1  5 
R&C  5  12  ...  ...  9  9 
Brokerage fee and other  16  20  3  10  3  10 
Total cost  32  150  4-8  35-65  14-18  49-79 
$ cost per average account of $22,000 in 
steady state (see panel A of table 3.1 above)  70  329  9-18  77-142  3 1-39  106-72 
Note: Retail costs are taken from tables 3.5 and 3.6 above. Centralized costs are taken from table 3.12 above. Institutional constrained-choice costs are taken 
from tables 3.12-3.15 above. Marketing costs under constrained choice are based on the assumption that fee ceilings or the competitive bidding process will 
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As to the relative cost effectiveness of a constrained IA system versus a 
centralized fund with no choice, we have seen that the extra costs associ- 
ated with IAs are negligible, providing that a modest level of service is 
chosen for record keeping and communicating with participants. At the 
same time, optional services might be unbundled so that those who use 
them pay for them. 
The most expensive service involves communication and education. It is 
not reasonable to expect consumers to make complicated financial choices 
without information. Our R&C cost estimate included an allocation for 
preparing and distributing published materials. However, we would argue 
that, especially for workers who are saving for the first time in their lives, 
the best education will come from practice-with  small amounts. This is 
another reason for simplifying and limiting choice, especially at the be- 
ginning of the new system. By the time accounts have grown and greater 
choice is permitted, most workers will already have learned from experi- 
ence. No doubt the popular press (newspapers, magazines, television talk 
shows) would  also play  a  significant role in educating the public  as it 
would surely face a huge demand once everyone had an IA. 
In sum, the structure of an IA system matters. Administrative costs need 
not make IAs prohibitively expensive. The cost of managing savings in a 
mandatory IA system can be significantly less than the cost of voluntary 
saving. By using the institutional market, an IA system that gives workers 
some choice can be structured to cost only slightly more than a single 
centrally managed fund with no choice. Decisions about whether to fund 
and whether to manage the funds publicly or privately should therefore 
depend on other factors, such as the economic benefits of funding and the 
risks and returns associated with public and private management of funds. 
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Comment  David A. Wise 
The authors have presented an enormous amount of information on the 
cost of operating mutual funds. The data are drawn from a broad range 
of sources. Some of the information is, I believe, especially relevant with 
respect to the projected administrative cost of operating a social security 
individual account  system. Given the information provided by  the au- 
thors, I am inclined to believe that the costs of operating individual ac- 
count programs-which  might evolve as part of social security reform- 
are likely to be  very low. Indeed, it seems to me that, whatever the pros 
and cons of  individual accounts, a proper interpretation of the data on 
administrative costs suggests that such costs should not be a determinant 
of whether such accounts are adopted. 
The data on Chile I found interesting in that these data show that it can 
be done, but perhaps the costs are not so relevant to prospective costs in 
the United States. 
Much of the information about the cost of  operating “retail” mutual 
funds in the United States is presented in the form of regressions showing 
the relation between mutual fund expense ratios and attributes of the fund. 
The results confirm that there are economies of scale with respect to the 
size of the fund, that actively managed funds (with substantial turnover) 
are associated with large administrative costs (especially emerging market 
funds), that funds for institutional investors (with large minimum invest- 
ments) incur lower costs, and that index funds operate with very low ad- 
ministrative cost. 
But the most relevant information, in my  view, pertains to the cost of 
operating specific funds. As far as I can tell, no one expects that individual 
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accounts would have participants choosing from the thousands of mutual 
funds available in the United States. Instead, it seems to me that invest- 
ment options would likely be limited. It also seems to me that individual 
contributions could be “bundled” in some way  to reduce the number of 
very small transactions, although I was not exactly clear what the authors 
had in mind in this respect. In addition, there is enormous room for vary- 
ing the “services” that funds provide, as the authors emphasize. 
The authors conclude that competition with respect to client service has 
resulted in high administrative cost among many “retail” mutual funds. 
Many of these services would appear to be unnecessary  in  the case of 
universal compulsory contributions. 
Thus, it seems to me that the information most relevant to social secu- 
rity individual accounts is the cost of operating specific types of plans like 
the federal employees’ Thrift Savings Plan or index funds in general. For 
such options, the administrative cost is very low. 
Exactly how to “keep the records” would have to be solved, but it is 
hard to believe that, in this world of technical capacity, that infrastructure 
cannot be worked out. Indeed, I believe that the computer facilities that 
the NBER uses to keep track of medicare and employer-provided medical 
insurance claims records could handle the job. 
It seems to me, however, that, even without the evidence of specific very 
low-cost plans, competition for individual accounts would tend to pro- 
duce many more low-cost options. And more index funds are an obvious 
example. If there is money to be made-and  surely there will be with so 
many participants-I  believe that firms will compete for it. 
But, what is more, I believe that what is happening independent of so- 
cial security reform is likely greatly to facilitate the adoption of individual 
social security accounts. In the early 1980s, few people were actively in- 
volved in the equity market. That is no longer true, and it will be even less 
true in coming years. Now, perhaps 45 percent of families participate in a 
401(k) plan, and these plans are still spreading rapidly. Including IRAs, 
an even larger number of families are gaining acquaintance with the equity 
market and, in particular, with mutual funds. Poterba, Venti, and Wise 
(1998) suggest that the cohort retiring in 2025 will have 401(k) assets at 
least as large as social security assets (under current provisions) and prob- 
ably much  more.  Those retiring  in  2035 will  have even  greater  401(k) 
assets. 
There are two things that are important about the spread of individual 
retirement saving, independent of social security. One is that individual 
accounts are less and less a new thing with which most families do not 
know how to deal. Indeed, there is a substantial amount of “investment” 
education provided by firms to employees. This education is just as appli- 
cable to social security individual accounts as to 401(k) accounts. Second, 
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sophisticated about investing and investment returns, there will be increas- 
ing competition to provide low-cost mutual funds, as many firms already 
do (although the authors here do not seem to see that, thus far, their data 
are really not appropriate for addressing this issue). Thus, I would look 
for lower administrative costs in response to greater awareness on the part 
of the rapidly growing number of IRA savers. I would guess that social 
security individual accounts would work in the same direction. In addi- 
tion, it seems to me that there is substantial room for piggybacking on the 
401(k) infrastructure. For example, employees in a firm with a 401(k) plan 
might choose the individual account investment from the same menu of 
options provided for the 401(k). 
Finally,  assuming  that  a  logical  way  to run  individual  accounts  is 
through the IRS, this provides substantial possibility for increasing sav- 
ing, especially among low-income households. It would be easy-once  the 
system is set up-to  allow tax filers to increase their contribution beyond 
the “minimum” requirement. In Canada, for example, each tax filer now 
receives a letter each year from the minister of  national revenue advising 
the recipient of the allowable registered retirement saving plan contribu- 
tion-which  could be described as a combination of U.S. IRA and Keogh 
plans-for  the year. Although this practice was adopted because of the 
complex Canadian contribution limits, it is evident that the practice may 
also serve to promote the program and thus increase saving. My guess is 
that any similar arrangement operated through our IRS would have the 
same effect. 
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Discussion Summary 
Michael Graetz expressed doubt regarding the ability of a system of indi- 
vidual accounts to “piggyback” on the existing 401 (k) infrastructure, not- 
ing that, while 62 percent of wage earners earned less than $15,000, only 
8.3 percent of workers held 401 (k) accounts. Consequently, Graetz reiter- 
ated the claim of the Graetz and Goldberg paper that the system should 
piggyback  on the social security and IRS infrastructure.  He also com- 
mented that he was not as sanguine as David Wise regarding the potential 
for reduction in marketing costs as a result of competition between fund 
managers under a system of individual accounts. Graetz claimed that one Mutual Funds and Institutional Investments  135 
advantage of the Goldberg and Graetz paper’s two-tiered approach (i.e., 
offering both a default plan and an opt-out plan) would be to hold down 
costs in the opt-out plan (Q-fund, or qualified private fund) as a result of 
the low-cost alternative of  the default (SPIF, or simple personal invest- 
ment fund) plan. Fred Grauer added that the marketing costs of passively 
managed  funds are significantly lower than  those  of  actively managed 
funds. 
James Poterba offered a comment regarding the proper interpretation 
of the James et al. paper’s regressions analyzing the determinants of ex- 
pense ratios of mutual funds. In general, he cautioned that looking cross- 
sectionally at the effect of various currently permissible activities on ex- 
pense ratios is quite different from analyzing the likely effect on expense 
ratios of restricting the mutual fund market’s set of permissible activities. 
He noted that the exact relation between the regressions and this latter 
question is not clear. 
Olivia Mitchell cited evidence from a recent Lipper study (Lipper Ana- 
lytical Services 1998) suggesting that, on average, older mutual funds have 
lower costs than newer ones. She suggested that James et al. may want to 
focus on the older funds as a benchmark, not the newer funds, which may 
still be  amortizing start-up costs. Estelle James agreed, noting that the 
authors had performed regressions in which the age of the fund was in- 
cluded and had a negative coefficient. James also suggested that the older 
funds’ lower costs may reflect a survival bias. 
Echoing James Poterba’s cautionary note on the interpretation of the 
expense-ratio regressions, Stephen Zeldes noted that the negative coeffi- 
cient on fund size had a causality problem. That is, large size may be driv- 
ing lower costs, but lower costs may also attract investors and thus lead to 
large size. He cited Vanguard as a possible example of this latter effect. 
Peter Diamond cited a recent ICI report (Rea and Reid 1998) that exam- 
ined average administrative costs of mutual funds with some equity com- 
ponent. Based on a dollar-weighted (on deposits) average, they arrived at 
a mean figure of  150 basis points for  1997. Diamond  suggested that it 
would be interesting to contrast this analysis with that of the James et 
al. paper. 
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